CLASSIFICATION OF ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL HEAVY CAVALRY

or

Cataphracts, We Hardly Knew Ye

 

There is often a confusion of terms used in describing the heavy cavalry traditions of the pre-gunpowder era. In particular, the term "cataphract" is too-often used indiscriminately (in my opinion) in reference to all heavy cavalry (i.e., armored cavalry), while the terms "composite cavalry" or "composite heavy cavalry" are underused. There also seems to be alot of confusion on what term(s) to use to distinguish between heavy cavalry types that acted primarily as bowmen/archers (i.e., horse archers), those that acted primarily as hard-charging close-combat cavalry armed primarily with a lance (i.e., lancers), and hard-charging close-combat heavy cavalry armed primarily with hand-to-hand weapons (e.g., sword, axe, mace)—indeed, whether such a division in classification is possible is much debated. However, I think it is important to distinguish between the combat system of the composite cavalryman, as it took shape across the Eurasian steppes (ca. 900 BCE-1500 CE) amongst the Aryan, Mongolic, and Turkic steppe nomads that later influenced the development of heavy cavalry traditions in China, Korea, Persia, and the Islamic world; the development of dedicated heavy cavalry lancers amongst the later Aryan peoples of the Kazakh and Pontic-Caspian steppes (ca. 300 BCE-600 CE) that later influenced the development of heavy cavalry traditions in Europe; and the development of cataphract heavy cavalry (ca. 250 BCE-842 CE) across a broad swathe of southern Central Asia (Chorasmia/Khwarezmia, Sogdia/Transoxania, Khorasan/Chorasan, and Tokharia/Xiyu) that later influenced the heavy cavalry traditions of the Caucasus, Mesopotamia, Syria, the Mediterranean, and Tibet.

 

Prior to the rise of the Mongolic and Turkic peoples, the masters of the Eurasian steppes were the Aryans, whose civilization (the Yamna Culture) first arose on the Pontic-Caspian Steppe (ca. 3800-2000 BCE), but by 900 BCE Aryan cultures had established themselves across most of the Eurasian steppes from Romania and Poland in the west to western China (Zungharia and the Ordos Plateau) in the east, as well as the Iranian Plateau, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and northern India (please see my essay on the identity of the Aryans). The Yamnaya/Aryans are believed to be the first humans to develop horse-based nomadism, and they are believed to be the first people to use horses as a platform for combat (originally chariots, later astride). The easternmost groups—the Yuezhi and Wusun—probably influenced the development of these practices amongst the early Mongolic peoples (via the Slab Grave Culture) and the Tibetans (via the Tokharian Culture). Unfortunately, we know far less about the composition of Aryan nomad societies than we do about the Turko-Mongol societies that gradually displaced or absorbed them on the Eurasian steppes (ca. 162 BCE-500 CE). By extension, we have only a general idea about the composition of their military systems, and although we can develop some pretty good inferential models, such models generally lack specificity. Mostly this is because none of the steppe-based Aryan nomads were literate societies, and most of the period sources we do have for them were written by men in civilizations that considered them to be enemies and/or barbarians (e.g., Assyria, Persia, Classical India, Greece, Rome, and China). We do not know whether the early Aryan steppe nomads (e.g., the Yuezhi, Wusun, Saka, Massagetae, Dahae, Issedones, Thyssagetae, Skythians/Scythians, Sarmatians, and Alans) had a horde system for recruiting and organizing their cavalry similar to the system used by the Mongolic and Turkic peoples (please see my essay on Hordes). Most (and perhaps all) of the early Aryan groups seem to have had a caste system, and the types of warriors fielded by the early Aryan steppe nomads seems to have been formally delineated by membership in a given caste. By contrast, the Turko-Mongolic horde system was more fluid, based on tribal membership, and the roles of various types of warriors within the system were determined by ability to equip themselves appropriately, and birth rights were less important—nobles were most often able to afford the equipment that made them heavy cavalry, but others could rise in importance and join the ranks of the heavy cavalry if they demonstrated prowess and achieved success in war. In Aryan societies, this upward mobility was more limited, although it seems likely that upper-caste heavy cavalrymen may have been accompanied by lower-caste retainers that they armed and armored sufficiently to allow them to operate in direct support of their patron on the battlefield (i.e., side-by-side). Among some groups (e.g., the Indo-Aryans and Persians) the caste system became highly developed, while among other groups (e.g., the Sarmatians and Alans) this system seems to have been pretty basic. As a basic rule of thumb, those Aryan groups that settled down alongside non-Aryan agricultural peoples—which led to the development of complex social aggregates and centralized states—seem to have had the more well-developed caste systems, and those groups that remained nomadic tended to have less well-developed caste systems. The overwhelming preponderance of evidence indicates that by about 900 BCE, the steppe-based Aryan nomads fielded similar types of cavalry to those later fielded by the Mongolic and Turkic peoples—all being primarily horse archers, with a minority of upper-caste nobles distinguishing themselves by their ability to afford a more extensive panoply. Between about 900 and 300 BCE, we see the development of a tactical dimension to this socio-economic distinction as these upper caste armored horse archers also increasingly assumed the role of primaries in initiating close combat with enemy units that had been worn down through typical horse archer skirmishing attacks. It is from this dual role—as horse archers and as close-combat specialists—that modern military historians have coined the term "composite cavalry" (i.e., they embodied a composite of two tactical functions). Horse armor appeared across the Eurasian steppe between about 550 and 300 BCE, probably as the result of the continuing specialization of noble warriors, although once again this was both predicated on their wealth and thus ability to better-arm themselves, but also a product of the practical need to better armor themselves as close-combat specialists.

 

Typically, horse archers were skirmishers—lightly equipped cavalry that used ranged weapons (bows, javelins, darts) to probe and harass enemy formations, to perform reconnaissance, and/or to screen the deployment of the heavy cavalry. Skirmishing horse archers were usually not prepared for sustained close combat (i.e., hand-to-hand fighting), and if such was offered, they usually ran away (i.e., made a tactical retreat). The idea was to wear down an opponent through frustration and injuries, in the hopes you could make him do something stupid, and thereby leave himself open to a decisive close-combat attack. Horse archers usually charged at an enemy formation, shooting arrows at them as they charged, then they swerved away before making contact, and as they retreated they would turn partway around in their seat so they could shoot more arrows at the enemy as they retreated (the Romans later called this "the Parthian shot," named after the Aryan group with whom they first encountered these tactics). Horse archers generally would cycle or rotate through this maneuver as many times as necessary to achieve a tactical advantage, until they were driven off, or until they could no longer continue due to logistical issues (e.g., if they ran out of rested remounts, ran out of arrows, etc.). By staying on the move, horse archers made themselves a difficult target, and because of the greater mobility that horses provided, horse archers could make multiple such hit-and-fade attacks (i.e., rotational attacks), removing themselves from the immediate vicinity of their enemies between each attack, which was particularly frustrating to armies that were geared toward decisive close-combat engagements. Often, nomad armies established staging areas far from the front lines to which warriors could retreat when they ran out of arrows and/or they and/or their horses were tired (blown is the term usually used for tired-out cavalry horses). Many warriors had remounts (i.e., extra horses) that could be kept in these rear staging areas, and in addition to a resupply of arrows, water, and other equipment, a cavalry trooper could change out his horse for a fresh one. If a cavalryman had an armored horse (only kings and emperors could afford to have more than one armored horse), he would not normally use it for rotational attacks because the horse would be slower and become exhausted more easily. Such warriors compensated for this by having additional unarmored mounts—a further expression of their wealth, as well as a practical matter—and they would use their unarmored mounts to make rotational attacks, and then switch to their armored horse when they believed the opportunity for a charge into close combat was imminent. In large armies put together by federations of tribes or states, where there was a plentiful supply of lightly equipped horse archers, composite heavy cavalrymen were often deployed for major battles in a separate battle line to that of the light horse archers (light horse archers in front, composite cavalry behind). Sometimes they would use unarmored remounts to join in the rotational attacks of the light cavalry, but they also seem to have sometimes remained mounted on their armored horses and to have supported the rotational attacks of the light cavalry with long-distance volleys. These volleys were probably timed to coincide with the initial charge and retreat of the light cavalry, to soften up the enemy as the light cavalry approached and to harry potential pursuers during the retreat. It had the added advantage of allowing the composite cavalry to conserve their energy for an anticipated charge into close combat. I have always thought a useful analogy for steppe nomad cavalry warfare is aircraft carrier combat during WWII, with the resting, resupplying, and remounting areas acting like the carriers, and the cavalry acting like the aircraft. You can extend the analogy further, by comparing the light cavalry skirmishers to fighters and the heavy cavalry to dive-bombers. Indeed, although the great Eurasian steppes often look like a flat, featureless expanse to outsiders, in most places they actually consist of gently rolling hills, draws, and sharply-cut arroyos and river courses, and steppe nomad cultures were adept at using these features to hide their staging areas and camps, as well as to confuse an enemy by making oblique attacks and retreats that made it difficult to pin-point the location of these areas.

 

Although we know that the early Aryan nomads (e.g., the Yuezhi, Wusun, Saka, Massagetae, Dahae, Issedones, Thyssagetae, and Skythians/Scythians) had this basic two-fold division between light cavalry skirmishers and composite heavy cavalry, and the early Mongolic peoples (e.g., the Xiongnu and Xianbei) adopted a similar system, beginning in about 300 BCE there was a divergence of practice between the Aryan-controlled regions of the Eurasian steppes (i.e., the Kazakh and Pontic-Caspian steppes) and the Mongolic-controlled regions (i.e., Mongolia and Manchuria). It has been suggested, although not conclusively proven, that it is the emphasis on caste that may explain the initial divergence of practice from composite cavalry, which continued to be important amongst the Mongolic and (later) Turkic peoples, and the lancer heavy cavalry that developed in the Aryan-dominated steppe regions from about 300 BCE to 600 CE (the Alans continued this tradition on the Pontic-Caspian Steppe until they were conquered by the Mongols in 1239, but by that time they had largely ceased living as steppe nomads and lived in and around the North Caucasus). The argument goes that the nobles of Aryan societies were more firmly bound by caste-based notions of their own fundamental superiority, and that this found expression in the military sphere by the development of a clear distinction between the martial arts practiced by lower castes (i.e., skirmishing and support roles) and those practiced by the upper caste (i.e., spearheading close combat). In this interpretation, the martial code of the upper caste also could not countenance a passive role (i.e., waiting for rotational archery attacks to create an opening), and instead the Aryan nobility would have felt compelled to enter close combat as quickly and decisively as possible. Enter the shock cavalry lancer, a combat system in which the purpose of the cavalryman was to make a swift and often impetuous charge into close combat (shock cavalry), preferably against the nobles of the opposing group (i.e., those considered to be "worthy" opponents), while the light cavalry skirmishers scouted, screened the deployment of the heavy cavalry, and provided direct fire support to the heavy cavalry charge. Early nomad heavy cavalry had been armed with spears that could be thrust or thrown, and these evolved into the lance, which better served shock cavalry by providing them with greater reach when charging into close-combat—hence, lancers—although sword, club/mace, and axe remained important side-arms once close contact was established. These early cavalry lances were two-handed due to their length, which meant that these heavy cavalrymen usually eschewed a shield, but partially compensated by wearing heavier body armor—the Greeks and Romans colorfully referred to these long two-handed lances as a kontos (Greek) or contus (Latin), which means "barge-pole." Ironically, horse armor seems actually to have been more rare amongst Aryan shock-cavalry lancers than it was amongst groups that fielded composite cavalry. It is presumed the reason is that horse armor would slow a charge, and the whole point was to get into close combat as swiftly as possible, preferably without exposing yourself to prolonged archery from those pesky light cavalry horse archers (and/or infantry). This may seem counter-intuitive, especially in light of the way later Mongol horse archers and composite cavalry dominated armies that used shock cavalry lancers (e.g., Russian druzhiniks and European knights), but human beings tend to cling to practices that have the imprimatur of tradition even when those practices (and the traditions that support them) have been shown to be obsolete (i.e., no longer efficacious). Nevertheless, the Aryan shock heavy cavalry lancer dominated the Eurasian steppes for a little over 300 years before the arms race between armorers and bowyers was won by the bowyers—it is believed that with the development of the Hunnic Bow (a composite re-curve bow), archers were able to combine their speed and accuracy with the penetrating power of the new bow to effectively stop a charge of even heavily armored cavalry in its tracks. With the ascendancy of the bow, composite cavalry once again reigned supreme.

 

Almost in parallel with the development of shock cavalry lancers on the Aryan steppe, cataphracts developed as a kind of sub-type of heavy cavalry lancers (ca. 300 BCE-842 CE). Initially, use of cataphract heavy cavalry is believed to have begun amongst the Aryan and proto-Tibetan peoples that had settled along the trade routes that would later be called "the Silk Road." Modern archeology has revealed that some of these routes may have been established as early as the second millennium BCE, but silk did not become the primary export of China along these routes until the Han Dynasty (207 BCE-220 CE), and the term "Silk Road" was not coined until the nineteenth century. There were four main regions that were important to early development of cataphracts—Tokharia/Xiyu, Sogdia/Transoxania, Khurasan/Chorasan, and Khwarezmia/Chorasmia. Tokharia (a.k.a., Xiyu, Pinyin, "Western Regions") was roughly analogous to the region known today as the Tarim Basin, dominated by the Taklimakan Desert and ringed by the Pamir Mountains in the west, the Tian Shan Mountains in the north, the Kunlun Mountains in the south, and the Qilian Mountains in the east. Sogdia (a.k.a., Transoxania, Latin, "Land Beyond the Oxus") lay to the southwest of Tokharia, roughly analogous to modern eastern Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, as well as modern western Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Its heartlands were between the Oxus River (a.k.a., the Amu Darya) and the Jaxartes River (a.k.a., the Syr Darya), although it included the important Ferghana and Shash (a.k.a., Tashkent) valleys to the northeast of the Jaxartes. Khwarezmia (a.k.a., Chorasmia-Greek, Huwarazamish-Old Persian, Khwarizm-Arabic, probabaly meaning "Lowlands") lay to the west of Sogdia/Transoxania. Its heart was the Khwarezmian/Chorasmian oasis, which lay directly to the south of the Aral Sea in the vicinity of the Oxus Delta, but often the steppes between the Aral Sea and the Caspian Sea were included as part of this region (western Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, as well as southwestern Kazakhstan). Finally, Khurasan (a.k.a., Chorasan-Greek, Xorasan-Middle Persian, meaning "Land of the Rising Sun") lay to the southwest of Sogdia/Transoxania and south of Khwarezmia/Chorasmia. Khorasan was probably the most ill-defined of these regions, encompassing the northern and eastern areas of the Iranian Plateau. The Persians often considered Afghanistan to be part of Khorasan. The northern half of Afghanistan was known in ancient times by the Greek name of Bactria/Bactriana (a.k.a., Bakhlo-Bactrian, Bakhtar-Persian, Daxia-Chinese, Bahlika-Sanskrit), roughly analogous to the modern Wakhan/Vakhan region, while southern Afghanistan was known as Haraxaiti (Avestan), Harauvati (Old Persian), or Arachosia (Greek and Latin), and was analogous to the modern Arghandab Valley. Cataphracts were most likely first developed in Tokharia/Xiyu, Sogdia/Transoxania, Khwarezmia/Chorasmia, Khurasan/Chorasan, Bactria, and Arachosia (ca. 300-200 BCE), but later the practice spread across the Iranian Plateau (ca. 250 BCE-576 CE) into Syria (ca. 125 BCE-273 CE) and the Mediterranean (ca. 117-1042 CE). At the same time, the cataphract combat system also seems to have been transmitted into Tibet via Tokharia/Xiyu (ca. 300 BCE-842 CE). The cataphract combat system seems to have grown out of the emerging Aryan heavy cavalry lancer tradition, and the early heavy cavalry of the Tokharians, Sogdians, Khwarezmians, Bactrians, Arachosians, and other Iranians look alot like shock heavy cavalry lancers. However, beginning in about 300 BCE we begin to see the particular exigences of the demographics/societies, topographies, and tactical requirements of these peoples lead to the evolution of the full-blown cataphract by about 250 BCE. What were these exigencies? Relatively high population density (demographic), the presence of populous agro-pastoralist peoples that rivaled the nomadic population (societal), the relative dearth of wide-open steppes suitable for large horse herds (topographic), and the need to develop heavy cavalry that could cope with enemies that fielded disciplined close-order infantry formations (tactical).

 

Unlike lancers, cataphracts generally did not make an impetuous charge, rather favoring an inexorable push (like a mounted pike phalanx). They were usually armed and armored very similarly to shock heavy cavalry lancers, with a long two-handed lance as the primary weapon and sword, axe, and/or mace as side-arms, although heavy armor for both man and horse seems to have been more uniform (remember that shock cavalry lancers sometimes eschewed horse armor to achieve speed in the charge). Indeed, the cataphract as a combat system seems to have initially developed as the response of societies with strong cavalry traditions to regularly facing opponents with disciplined infantry (spearmen/pikemen and bowmen)—in the case of the Tokharians, Qiang and Chinese infantry traditions may have spurred this development, especially after the Han Dynasty moved into the Tarim Basin (ca. 200 BCE-89 CE), while in Sogdia, Khwarezmia, Khorasan, Bactria, and Arachosia the eastern campaigns of Alexander the Great (ca. 330-324 BCE) and the foundation of the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom (256-125 BCE) would have had the same effect. The shock value of a charge attack has been shown, through the work of modern historians like John Keegan, to have been ineffective against disciplined infantry, largely due to the fact that most horses usually refuse to gallop into a dense mass of enemies (no matter how well-trained). Cavalry charges generally only succeeded when facing low-density formations that had interstices into which horses will charge, or against defending formations that are in the process of breaking up (often due to fear in the case of men unfamiliar with cavalry, or due to demoralization from a steady drain of casualties exacted by skirmishing attacks). All ancient and Medieval cavalry were particularly adept at riding down fleeing opponents, especially those on foot. It should be noted, however, that especially well-trained warhorses can be trained to charge into dense formations—but such horses have been historically very rare (some European knights of the Middle Ages had such mounts, called "chargers," but the selective breeding and training of such beasts was time- and labor-intensive, and required a particular temperament in the individual horse, which meant that they were never even close to ubiquitous). The answer, then, for most peoples that wished to have heavy cavalry that could stand toe-to-toe with discliplined infantry was highly disciplined, very heavily armored cavalrymen and mounts operating in close-order formations that did not so much charge into enemy formations as trundle inexorably into them. Horses won't gallop into a dense group of men, but they will walk into them, especially if their riders are using long lances to make contact with the enemy—and hopefully open up gaps—before the horse is expected to make potential physical contact with them. In this situation, the advantages of the mounted pikeman over his infantry counterpart are two-fold—the weight of the horse, which contributes to the momentum of the lance thrust, and the height advantage of the cavalrymen once the lance has been discarded and side-arms put into use. Although, like lancers, cataphract formations were sometimes paired with light cavalry skirmishing archers to provide direct fire-support, many later cataphract formations (e.g., the kataphractoi of the Byzantines) developed into more-autonomous units in which the interior of the cataphract formation (e.g., a wedge), or the rear ranks in a line formation, were armed with missile weapons (bows, javelins, and/or darts) so the unit had its own direct fire-support. Other considerations were that these societies did not have the huge horse herds maintained by steppe nomads, and therefore both remounts for blown horses and replacements for dead or injured ones were not in plentiful supply, so conserving your resources in horse flesh was a priority (thus, both the heavy armor and tight formations). These were also urban and agro-pastoralist societies, surrounded by mountains and deserts, and infantry was far more important than in steppe nomad armies, so the cavalry used by such societies tended to complement the tactical operations of infantry formations—the kind of long-distance "carrier combat" of the steppe nomads was not suitable to an army that consisted largely of infantry, which only had greater mobility than cavalry in rough terrain.

 

The Chinese were affected by nomad heavy cavalry traditions during the northern expeditions of the Han Dynasty against the Xiongnu (ca. 133 BCE-91 CE) and the western expeditions that led to the occupation of the Tarim Basin (ca. 60 BCE-107 CE), and they were further influenced during the long period of nomad invasions and occupations of western and northern China (ca. 420-581 CE) that followed the fall of the Jin Dynasty, but lack of evidence makes it unclear whether this produced a cataphract-like heavy cavalry tradition in northern and western China between the fall of the Jin Dynasty (ca. 420 CE) and the rise of the Sui Dynasty (ca. 581 CE). We know that thereafter, during the Sui and Tang dynasties (ca. 581-907 CE), Chinese heavy cavalry traditions seem to have emphasized (or re-emphasized, depending on your interpretation of the evidence) mounted archery under the influence of the Tujue (eastern Turks) and Mongolic peoples, with close-combat being a secondary function (i.e., composite cavalry), and so it seems unlikely that the Chinese ever utilized true cataphracts. It's true that they suffered from many of the same limitations that had led to the development of cataphracts in southern Central Asia, but the Chinese always seemed to prefer to use Turkic and/or Mongolic auxiliaries to make up for the fact that native cavalry units were often few in number and of poor quality. To my mind, this means that only the armies of the Western Protectorates (Xiyu Duhu Fu) of China (i.e., Tokharia) were likely to have ever used cataphract cavalry, and these would have been local auxiliaries (i.e., not used outside the region). The only certain evidence we have for an East Asian cataphract tradition comes from the Tibetan Empire (618-842 CE) and the Tangut Empire (1038-1227 CE). Both empires made a clear distinction between light cavalry horse archers and heavy cavalry lancers, and the heavy cavalry of both empires are consistently described as charging with long, two-handed lances, in very tight formations. They, too, often carried bows, but period sources make it plain that these bows were a secondary weapon intended primarily for driving off enemy horse archers. The Tibetans were, however, related to the Tokharians and lived in relatively close proximity to them (the Tibetan Plateau lies directly south of the Tarim Basin), and so it seems likely that they were affected by the development of cataphract cavalry in Tokharia/Xiyu (ca. 300 BCE-450 CE). Ironically, with the conquest of the Tarim Basin by the Hephthalite Huns (ca. 450 CE), and the subsequent domination of the region by various Turkic (Göktürks and Uyghurs), Mongolic (Tuyuhun), and Chinese (Sui and Tang) dynasts (ca. 450-670 CE), the cataphract tradition seems to have given way to that of composite cavalry in this region, and the cataphracts of the Tibetans and Tanguts are something of an anomaly (both were peoples that originated on the Tibetan Plateau, and who invaded and occupied the Tarim Basin). There is some evidence that the Xianbei, Jurchen, and Koreans may have developed heavy cavalry that may have corresponded to the fighting system of the cataphract as defined herein—there are scattered references to heavy cavalry formations that were "chained together" to maintain their close-order formations, and this is usually interpreted to mean they operated in cataphract-like wedges or phalanx—but even in these instances, it is obvious from the battle descriptions and the equipment carried by the troopers that archery was their primary function, and that a charge into close combat was only considered favorable when archery had created a tactical advantage (i.e., composite cavalry).

 

Where cataphracts made their greatest impact was in the cavalry traditions of the Iranian Plateau, in the Caucasus, in Syria, and in the eastern Mediterranean, where Hellenistic (ca. 200-30 BCE), Parthian (ca. 250 BCE-224 CE), Armenian (250 BCE-576 CE), Persian (ca. 250 BCE-576 CE), Syrian (ca. 125 BCE-273 CE), Roman (ca. 227-480 CE), and Byzantine (ca. 480-1001 CE) cataphracts carried the tradition well into the Middle Ages. In Sogdia, Khwarezmia, Khorasan, Afghanistan, Iran, Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Syria this system was swept away by the coming of the Huns and the Turks, whose composite cavalry traditions led to the development of the ghulam/ghilman and related cavalry traditions of the Medieval Islamic world. The Romano-Byzantine tradition seems to have had some influence on the development of the European knight of the Middle Ages, but it is difficult to trace the evolution. The Romans sometimes distinguished between two types of heavy cavalry—cataphractarii and clibanarii—and the Byzantines did the same (kataphractoi and klibanophoroi), but we do not know whether this is two different terms for the same type of heavy cavalry or terms for different types of heavy cavalry. We know that the Roman term, cataphractarii, came from the Hellenistic kataphractoi (meaning, "fully armored"), and that the Hellenistic term referred to cataphracts as I've defined them herein. The Greco-Roman term, klibanophoroi/clibanarii, means "camp oven bearers," and seems to have been a reference to heavy armor, which would have acted like an oven for the men wearing such armor in the hot sun of the Mediterranean, Syria, and Mesopotamia. Some military historians have suggested that klibanophoroi/clibanarii were lancers on the Western Aryan nomad model (e.g., the Sarmatians and Alans), and kataphractoi/cataphractarii were cataphracts on the Iranian/Syrian model, but the Romans referred to Sarmatian and Alan heavy cavalry lancers as contarii ("barge-pole wielders"), which makes one wonder why they would have used a different term for their own heavy cavalry if indeed they had heavy cavalry modeled on the Sarmatian/Alan usage. My personal belief is that there is no compelling evidence to suggest that the terms kataphractoi/cataphractarii and klibanophoroi/clibanarii refer to different types of heavy cavalry (i.e., they are two different terms for the same type of heavy cavalry, which I herein refer to as "cataphracts"). There also seems to be a clear break in the heavy cavalry traditions of Europe between the fall of the Roman Empire and the emergence of the institution of knighthood in the European Middle Ages. Some attempt has been made to show that the Germanic peoples fielded "Sarmaticized" heavy cavalry, and that this is the link between the ancient Aryan lancers and the Medieval knight, but these arguments are sorely lacking in concrete evidence, and as I discuss in my East Germanic gallery, I think this argument is ultimately false. A much stronger argument can be made for the dual influence of the composite heavy cavalry of the Avars, Magyars, and Bulgars on the one hand, and the Byzantine cataphract on the other hand, making the European Medieval knight a cross between these two traditions. The same can be said for early Russian druzhiniks and similar eastern European (e.g., Polish and Lithuanian) heavy cavalry. While Medieval European knights did not generally carry bows, the wearing of heavier armor and the carrying of substantial shields seem to have been predicated on the need to protect against archery during the charge, and the charge itself could have been an adaptation of Byzantine cataphract practice (by that time, Byzantine cataphracts were more lightly armored than in previous generations, and seem to have started to evolve back toward a shock lancer tradition). Early Medieval knights, in particular, did not often face disciplined bodies of infantry, and so they faced the same types of tactical situations that had earlier led to the development of Aryan shock lancers—a mounted elite that preferred to charge into close combat as quickly as possible in order to ride-down ill-disciplined social inferiors (infantry) and, preferably, to engage social equals on the other side in heroic hand-to-hand combat. Thus, I would argue for an independent development of shock heavy cavalry in the form of the Medieval European knight, rather than the idea that it was an inheritance of late Classical practices.

 

To my mind, a distinction should be made between fully armored (i.e., both man and horse) heavy cavalry that emphasized archery, but retained a strong close-combat capability (i.e., composite cavalry), heavily armored (i.e., man and sometimes horse) heavy cavalry that emphasized close-combat, but may or may not have retained archery as a secondary function (i.e., lancers), and fully armored (i.e., man and horse) heavy cavalry that emphasized close combat, may or may not have retained archery (or other ranged weapons) as a secondary/supporting role, and operated in very close-order formations with drilled group maneuvers (i.e., cataphracts). If a good analogy can be made between skirmishing horse archers and composite cavalrymen and carrier combat in WWII, lancers and skirmishing horse archers can be compared to tanks and mechanized artillery, but cataphracts I like to think of as mounted pikemen.