MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE KHITAN EMPIRE

 

Before I begin a discussion of the military system of the Khitans, I would like to quickly point interested readers to the button at the bottom of this page, which reads, “Hordes.” I have several galleries on this site that are devoted to early Mongolic and Turkic military systems, and rather than repeat myself numerous times, I thought it best to consolidate my discussion of the Mongolic and Turkic steppe nomad military institution known as “the horde” to a separate page that could be referenced from multiple locations. I highly recommend taking a look, especially if you start reading here and find that I'm using some terms with which you are not familiar, or if your understanding of some terms does not seem to correlate to my usage(s).

 

The strategic posture of the Khitan Empire (907-1125 CE) was, as one might expect, significantly different from that of the earlier Pre-Dynastic Period (discussed in my essay on hordes). At its height, the Khitan Empire commanded vast resources (men and material), including a population of 750,000 Khitan inhabitants and 3 million Chinese subjects, as well as an unknown number of Balhae (i.e., Korean), Turkic (Shatuo), Turko-Mongolic (Naiman, Tatar, Khereid, Merkit, Zubu), Tunguso-Mongolic (Shiwei), and Tungusic (Jurchen) tributary allies. There were numerous prosperous cities, mostly in the south (the sixteen prefectures of China and the Shatuo states) and east (the former heartlands of the Balhae Kingdom), and the empire became the dominant partner in a relatively stable economic triumvirate (Khitan Empire, Tangut Empire, Song Dynasty of China) that controlled the eastern terminals of the Silk Road. However, the Khitan Empire was divided by two major cultural spheres that were reflected in a dual government administration. Basically, the Northern Administration (Inner Manchuria, Mongolia, and the parts of Outer Manchuria occupied by the Jurchen) was organized as a Turko-Mongolic khaganate, and the Southern Administration (northern China and the parts of southern Outer Manchuria occupied by the Balhae) was a Confucian bureaucracy. In the Chinese and Shatuo territories, the Khitans merely inserted themselves at the apex of the exisiting governmental bureaucracy with relatively little disruption of the established socio-political order, but the Balhae population proved so restive (i.e., given to rebellion) that the Khitans instituted a commandery system in the agricultural and urban centers of the former Balhae Kingdom. These commanderies (jun or chun) were governed by Khitan commandants backed up by significant garrisons and administered through a Confucian bureaucracy mostly staffed by imported Chinese bureaucrats—there were also Balhae administrators, but the Balhae governmental system seems to have been largely dismantled, and the Khitan conquest of Balhae also led to a mass migration of the Korean intelligentsia and aristocracy to Goryeo (as many as 10,000 fled the Khitan conquest). There was tension between the highly Sinicized imperial court of the Liao emperors/khagans and the Khitan tribal traditionalists, and the northern and western border regions were never completely pacified—the Turko-Mongolic tribes (Naimans, Tatars, Khereids, Merkits, Zubus), the Shiwei tribes, the Sinicized Turk states (Shatuo), and the Jurchen tribes were treated as subordinate states/tributary allies, but the Khitans had a range of relationships with the various sub-groups of these peoples that ranged from outright domination to nominal overlordship.

 

There were four strategic components to the military system of the Khitan Empire—the regulars (cheng), the irregulars (chiu), the guards (junlu), and the provincial militia (fan). The Northern Administration was divided into 18 “inner tribes” (tai-tsu) and 34 “outer tribes” (sheng-tsu). The outer tribes (sheng-tsu) consisted of Khitan groups that had migrated onto the Mongolian Plateau after the exodus of the Uyghurs, as well as nomadic tributary allies like the Turko-Mongolic groups that inhabited the southwestern (Naimans), northwestern (Keraites), central (Zubus), southeastern (Tatars), and northeastern (Merkits) regions of Mongolia, the Shiwei groups of northern Manchuria and southeastern Siberia, and the Tungusic tribes of Outer Manchuria (Jurchen). In times of need, the chiefs and kings of these tribal groups, classed as daren in the Khitan noble hierarchy, were required to muster hordes according to ancient Turko-Mongolic traditions (please see the Horde button below). These hordes formed the irregular (chiu) component of the Khitan-Liao army. The inner tribes (tai-tsu) consisted of those Khitan tribes that inhabited the central territories of the empire (Inner Manchuria). From the time of Abaoji, these tribes were gradually transformed into quasi-feudal baronies whose chiefs were classed as cishi. The hordes of the inner tribes were replaced by regiments of regulars (cheng) that became the backbone of the Khitan-Liao army. The Khitan imperial court laid out a series of regulations that governed the terms of service of these units, including how they were to be recruited, trained, and equipped. Imperial overseers made certain these standards were met. Unlike the old hordes, which were only called up for specific campaigns for limited periods of time, and whose warriors were herdsmen and only part-time warriors, the regular regiments of the Khitan-Liao army recruited men who wanted to make a full-time career of soldiering. Ethnic Khitan from the inner tribes formed the initial core of these units, and ethnic Khitan remained the favored candidates for recruitment throughout the Khitan-Liao period, but the regular regiments also admitted recruits from the outer tribes, from among the Balhae, and from among the Chinese. There were between 500 and 700 troopers in each regiment of regulars. Based on 18 inner tribes, this gives us a tentative starting number of between 9,000 and 12,600 regular troopers. However, by the end of the Khitan-Liao period, there were more regular regiments than there were inner tribes, and the number of regular regiments seems to have fluctuated. According to the regulations, each trooper was accompanied by a forager (“one that gathers fodder and grain”) and an orderly (“one that cares for the camp”). The regulations are quite clear that the forager was an armed and armored retainer, recruited from the same sources as the regular troopers, while the orderly seems only to have been a domestic servant, usually recruited from a subject people (particularly the Chinese or Balhae/Koreans). Thus, with the addition of foragers, our minimum tally of regular cavalrymen would go up to between 18,000 and 25,100. There is another factor to consider, however—not all regulars were cavalry. Only about 75% of each regiment was composed of cavalrymen, and the remainder of each regiment was infantrymen. This only works out to about 125 infantrymen per regiment, since the regulations do not indicate that these infantrymen were paired with armed retainers (i.e., foragers) as were the mounted troopers. This gives us a tentative core group of regulars for the Khitan-Liao military that comes to approximately 13,500-18,750 cavalrymen (troopers and foragers) and only 4,500-6,275 infantrymen. Regiments of regulars were used for a number of tasks—as the core units of an imperial field army, to garrison walled cities (ch'eng) and forts (pao), to patrol the empire and police trade routes, and to escort foreign dignitaries and merchant caravans. Although we do not know for certain the overall size of the Khitan military, field armies are believed to have been between 50-70,000 men. Based on what we know of typical Khitan battle deployments (see my discussion of Khitan tactics below), regulars would have made up roughly two-thirds of most armies, which actually gives us a pretty close number to the one I've given above for the minimum total strength of the regulars (i.e., approximately 15-20,000 men). However, it is unlikely that the entire complement of regulars would have been called in for every campaign (they still had an empire to control). So where did the extra regulars come from?

 

The Khitan Empire also developed a commandery system that is something of an unknown quantity in the analysis of the Khitan-Liao military system. Each commandery (jun or chun) was like a feudal appanage—the grant of an estate, title, and/or office—that also carried with it the right to recruit, equip, and maintain a guard battalion (junlu or chunlu). There were basically two types of commandery—those that were part of the imperial demesne, and those granted by emperors to favored grandees (usually members of one of the clans of the imperial lineage). Each Khitan emperor created a new guard battalion upon his accession. Old battalions were not, however, disbanded upon the death of their patron emperor, although they were allowed to slowly fade away through natural rates of attrition (i.e., combat losses and retirement). Thus, at any given point in time beyond the first couple of emperors this would have meant that there could have been several viable imperial guard battalions in service simultaneously. One can only assume that they were required to transfer their allegiance to their patron's successor. The imperial commandery seems to have included both his personal wealth—herd animals and accumulated goods, landed estates (especially in the Chinese, Shatuo, and Balhae territories), and taxes (touxia) levied from the populace of the five imperial circuit capitals (tao ching)—and the imperial guard battalions were equipped and maintained using these sources of wealth, while the regular regiments were equipped and maintained at the expense of the inner tribes. The second type of commandery guard unit initially arose from the conquest of the Balhae Kingdom (ca. 926 CE), although by the end of the Khitan-Liao period the practice had evolved and encompassed other parts of the empire. The former agricultural and urban territories of Balhae were initially organized as a satellite state—the Dongdan Kingdom (926-936 CE)—which was divided into a number of commanderies. These were territorial estates granted to the great lords of the nascent empire (she-li, literally, “turban-wearers”), most of whom were scions of one of the imperial lineages. The imperial crown prince, Yelü Bei (899-937 CE), was named Dongdan Muhua (“King of Dongdan”) and oversaw the governance of these commanderies. However, upon the death of Yelü Abaoji (later in the same year of the founding of the Dongdan Kingdom), the dowager empress, Shulü Ping, arranged for the accession of her favorite son,Yelü Deguang, instead of Yelü Bei (Abaoji's intended heir). Yelü Bei tried to rally support, but a majority of the nobles of the empire backed Shulü Ping and Yelü Deguang. After a brief attempt to rebel, Yelü Bei was captured, but his mother spared him and allowed him to continue to rule Dongdan as a vassal of his brother. However, as you might expect, the two brothers remained suspicious of one another, and in 930 CE Yelü Bei fled to Tang China (he spent the last seven years of his life as a Tang military governor, jiédùshǐ, in Huaihua Province, modern Hebei). Dongdan was then ruled by Yelü Bei's son, Yelü Ruan, until the emperor (Yelü Deguang) decided to annex the kingdom outright in 937 CE. Although the kingdom was dissolved, the commanderies remained, and as the empire grew, commanderies were also established in other parts of the empire. Each grant of a commandery also granted the appointee the right to recruit, equip, and maintain a guard unit (the proceeds from taxing the populace of the commandery were used to do this). Unlike regular regiments, these guard battalions could be quite large (over 1,000 men each), but they do seem to have been conceived as something like supersized regular regiments (or private armies), with identical recruitment, equipment, and training to that of the regulars. Unfortunately, we really don't have any idea how many guard battalions may have been in service at any given time—by the end of the Khitan-Liao period, the granting of commanderies had apparently become a problem, and some of the revolts and civil wars of the late Liao were the result of competition between the regional powerbases of various lords, each with his own private army. Under normal circumstances, commandery battalions were almost certainly used to bulk out the numbers of regulars in specific campaigns—this would have allowed the Khitan emperors to leave many of their regular regiments at their posts (especially important for garrisons), only drawing off a portion of the total numbers of the regulars for each campaign.

 

Finally, the Southern Administration oversaw the Chinese and Sinicized Shatuo Turk territories of northern China, and in addition to Khitan viceroys (liuyuan-si-da-wang) and Khitan garrisons (mostly regulars), the Khitans maintained regional militias (fan) recruited from the local subject populace. In the Shatuo states and Chinese provinces, the Khitans basically took over the extant bureaucratic administration, including its native hierarchy of nobles and officials, and there seems to have been very little disruption of the Shatuo-Chinese socio-political order. Shatuo and Chinese subjects could still rise in the ranks of the bureaucracy, even being posted to positions in the Northern Administration (something that caused tension between the Khitan imperial court and the tribal traditionalists), and some Shatuo and Chinese militia units achieved elite status (something that also caused tension with the nomad traditionalists). Although the Khitans were known (infamously) to sometimes conscript masses of peasants or war-captives to drive before their armies, or to attack fortifications, and these were usually Chinese or Balhae subjects (or POWs), most Chinese militia units would have been reminiscent of those fielded by Song China—armored (although lacking shields) cavalry armed with spear, halberd, and/or sword; armored (sometimes having large shields, sometimes not) infantry armed with spears, halberds, swords (one- and two-handed), and/or axes (one- and two-handed); armored infantry crossbowmen; and unarmored skirmishing infantry bowmen. The Khitans also used Chinese military engineers, including artillerists, sometimes in large numbers, both in the field and in siege warfare. The situation was initially similar in Balhae/Dongdan. In addition to the commandants and guard battalions, there were Balhae militia units—armored composite cavalry (nobles), unarmored horse archers, infantry spearmen and crossbowmen, and skirmishing infantry archers. However, there were several rebellions of the Balhae populace (ca. 927-938, 938-986, and 1029-1030 CE), which led emperor Shengzong of Liao to disband all Balhae militia units and to ban the carrying of weapons by all Balhae subjects of the empire (ca. 1030 CE)(although Balhae still seem to have been recruited into regular regiments and commandery guard battalions). Although the Shatuo Turks had been thoroughly Sinicized by the beginning of the tenth century CE, some militia units recruited from the Shatuo states would still have had a Turkic character—a mix of armored composite cavalry and unarmored horse archers—as well as Chinese units of the same types recruited in the sixteen prefectures.

 

It is difficult to translate what we know about the strategic potential of the Khitan Empire into an understanding of the tactical stance of a typical imperial Khitan field army and its constituent elements. The regulations that governed the recruitment, training, and equipment of regulars have survived in the “History of Liao” (Liao Shi), a work commissioned by the Mongol/Yuan emperor, Toghon Temür (1320-1370 CE), and executed by the historian, Toqto'a (1314-1356 CE), using previous Chinese histories and Khitan records. I used the English-language translation and analyzation by Karl August Wittfogel and Feng Chia-Sheng, in the “History of Chinese Society: Liao (907-1125).” There are also a scattering of scroll paintings and tomb frescoes that may or may not depict Khitan warriors, and a few accounts of Khitan campaigns in Chinese and Korean histories. Although there are definitely drawbacks to each of these sources, not least of which being their lack of comprehensiveness, the sources are consistent in the broad strokes. Khitan practice obviously grew out of the North Asian nomad traditions that I have outlined in my essay on hordes (see button below), but the Khitan system is often seen as the product of the culmination of a period of martial evolution that saw the gradual assimilation of traditional nomad tactics with imperial Chinese doctrines. In a nut-shell, the imperial Khitan system applied concepts like standardization in equipment, regimentation of tactical units, and drilled maneuver of battlefield formations to the otherwise free-flowing, extemporaneous, and often impetuous tactics of the steppe nomads. This merger of styles should probably not be attributed to the Khitans as something particularly innovative—certainly, earlier Turko-Mongolic peoples, especially those that came to inhabit regions of western and northern China, experimented with this for centuries—but the Khitans do seem to have been the first nomad empire to bring all these elements together into a coherent system. And there can be little doubt that the Khitans heavily influenced the development of other, later, better-known imperial systems, like that of the Mongols under Temujin Chinggis Kha'an (a.k.a., Genghis Khan). Khitan armies deployed in three lines, each line sub-divided into ranks. We are told that there were ten ranks per line. Ideally, the lines were deployed on a typical battlefield in succession—a front line, middle line, and rear line. The depth of each Khitan line, as well as the depth of the overall deployment (i.e., three lines instead of two), are often noted as part of what made the Khitan system distinct from ordinary nomad practice. The sources also tell us that the first line was “unarmored,” the second line was “half-armored,” and the third line was “fully armored.” The sources go on to tell us that each line in turn made rotational hit-and-fade archery attacks against the enemy. Each rank of each line would make hit-and-fade attacks until an opening for a hand-to-hand assault presented itself, or the rank was forced to retire to restock arrows and change out blown mounts. Ranks would retire to the rear of the line, where supplies and remounts were kept, while the next rank made its own rotational attacks. If an opening for a close-combat assault was perceived, the remaining ranks would join in such an attack, as necessary and depending on the overall tactical situation. If a line failed to achieve a tactical advantage by the time all ranks had made their attacks, or if the line had been driven off by the enemy, the next line would move up to make its own series of rotational attacks while the previous line retired to the rear of the army, once again with the intention of resupplying and remounting. It seems that it was believed that by the time the last, most heavily armored line got its turn, most enemy armies would have been exhausted, demoralized, and/or weakened by casualties, and therefore ripe to be destroyed by a decisive charge from the heavily armored third line, but the sources are also clear that the third line could perform its own rotational attacks if necessary. The Khitans purportedly could keep up this system of rank and line rotation for days, if necessary, even when in retreat.

 

The composition of each line is, however, difficult to match up to what we know of the four strategic components of the Khitan military system—the regulars (cheng), irregulars (chiu), commandery guards (junlu), and militia (fan). The fact that the first line was said to be “unarmored” has led some authors to suggest that this line was composed of the orderlies mentioned in the regulations, but I think it is quite clear from the regulations that the orderlies were nothing but servants, and they were not ordinarily expected to fight. What seems far more likely to me is that the orderlies, who were mounted, probably waited with the supplies and remounts of the second two lines, and that they helped the foragers and regular troopers to re-supply and re-mount. The best candidates for inclusion in the first line seem to me to be the irregular troops (chiu) of the outer tribes (sheng-tsu). We need not be too slavish in viewing the first line as being literally unarmored—ancient authors often glossed over the martial abilities and equipment of those they considered to be social inferiors, sometimes referring to them as “naked” or “unprotected” as a kind of hyperbole that suggested their barbarity or lack of social distinction relative to the socially superior groups of warriors, who were considered the only ones worth writing about in detail. I would also suggest that the strictly regimented rank system would likely not apply to the first line, which probably operated in traditional nomad fashion (i.e., still rotational skirmishing attacks, just not regimented). The authors of our sources were Chinese, most wrote decades or even centuries after the fall of the Khitan Empire, and they had to rely on second- or third-hand sources, and it seems likely they attributed the organized, drilled maneuvers of the Khitan regulars to the entire army in order to emphasize it, and simply ignored subtle distinctions. The second two lines are also problematic, and have led to much debate. What exactly does “half-armored” mean in reference to the second line? Are half the men (and horses) fully armored and half unarmored, are all the men of the line wearing some sort of inferior armor in comparison to the fully armored third line, or are the men wearing armor and the horses are unarmored? Your answer to these questions largely rests on your interpretation of the role of the foragers mentioned in the regulations. Were they like Medieval European squires or men-at-arms, fighting side-by-side with the regular troopers in the same battlefield formations? I think not. That interpretation does not make sense in this context. Yes, the Khitans had developed a more regimented system, and they undoubtedly seem to have added some depth to the formations usually fielded by steppe nomads, but in its essence the Khitan system was still based on traditional nomad tactics in which the socially inferior ordinary tribesmen, who were usually more lightly equipped than the nobles, fought in a separate skirmishing line intended to soften up enemy formations in preparation for a charge by the line of more heavily equipped nobles. The foragers undoubtedly had a military role—the regulations specify that they, but not their horse, needed to be armored and equipped to a fairly high standard—but they are also definitely the social inferiors of the regular troopers—only regular troopers are counted for purposes of unit strength, and although we know there were supposed to be an equal number of foragers, they are basically listed along with equipment as something that needed to be supplied along with each trooper. The regulations enumerate that each trooper was to be supplied with 3 horses (one of which was to be armored), 9 pieces of armor (hauberk, helmet, greaves (x2), vambraces (x2), chanfron, barding, and shield), 4 bows (with 400 arrows), a long spear (for thrusting), a short spear (for throwing), a halberd, a sword, a mace, assorted camp supplies, a forager (with his own equipment and at least one horse), and an orderly (with his own horse). The fact that not all this equipment could possibly be carried by a regular trooper at any one time lends itself further, I think, to the idea that the orderlies likely waited in the rear with extra equipment (the Khitans used Bactrian camels to carry supplies), and to tend remounts, but it also makes it obvious that the foragers were considered to be an addendum to the regular troopers, likely with a separate role on the battlefield. Thus, I believe “half-armored” should be interpreted to mean that the men in the second line were armored, but their horses were unarmored, and that the foragers filled the role of the light cavalry skirmishers (i.e., ordinary tribesmen), while the regular troopers filled the role of heavy composite cavalry (i.e., nobles). Because the foragers were still highly trained and well-equipped professionals, this would have added a significant dimension to Khitan warfare. If indeed commandery guard battalions were organized on similar lines to those of the regular regiments, and I believe they were, fitting them into this battle scheme would have been simple—the fully armored troopers brigaded into the third line, and their foragers brigaded into the second line. I have seen some authors suggest that guard battalions may have been specialized lancers, but there is no evidence for this, and I think it much more likely that, despite perhaps very high-quality equipment and more decorative elements of kit, that the constituent elements of most junlu units conformed to the same standards as the regulars (junlu troopers were probably also paired with foragers).

 

Where militia units fit into this battle scheme is mostly described in reference to siege warfare, with one major exception—to the horror of later Chinese authors, large numbers of Chinese and Balhae/Korean peasants and captives were sometimes conscripted and driven, usually unarmed, into the teeth of enemy forces on the battlefield or against fortifications. Such attacks were intended to force the enemy to waste arrows, to create confusion in the enemy ranks, and to fill the minds of enemy soldiers with horror at the ruthlessness of the Khitan war machine. Some enigmatic (because they are terse) references are made to better-equipped Chinese (and until 1030 CE, Balhae) and Shatuo militia units, often fighting under their own commanders, some units of which achieved elite status (i.e., imperial guard units). Cavalry units of the militia were probably usually deployed in the first line of the battle order, although those that gained in status due to outstanding service may have been promoted to one of the second two lines (auxiliaries of the outer tribes do not seem to have been accorded such possibilities, which indicates one of the likely sources of tension that arose between tribal traditionalists and the imperial court). Infantry would have been used in a variety of ways—to guard the baggage, to guard rally points on a battlefield (i.e., the area where the fresh stocks and remounts were positioned), to counter particularly formidible enemy infantry, and to defend or attack fortifications. Artillery units were used most often in siege warfare, although as with the Mongols later, the Khitans do seem to have sometimes deployed artillery in support of their troops on certain battlefields where it was deemed tactically expedient (e.g., trying to force a guarded ford in a river or to assault an entrenched position).