LATE PRE-ISLAMIC ARABS

(410 BCE - 969 CE)

 

NORTHERN ARABIA

Old Arabia (Syrian, Harran, Nafud, and Hisma deserts) &

the Hijaz/Hejaz (northern Red Sea coastal plain and highlands)

Adnanites

Lihyanite Kingdom (400 BCE - 106 CE) and the Banu Lihyan (106 - 625 CE); Banu Udhrah (117 - 627 CE);

Banu Judham (117 - 636 CE); Banu Amila/Amela (117 - 638 CE); Banu Balqayn (117 - 636 CE);

Banu Bali (117 - 636 CE); Banu Juhaynah (106 - 625 CE)

Kahlans

Banu Tanukh (196 - 275 CE), the Tanukhid Phylarchate (275 - 295 & 383 - 639 CE), and the Tanukhid Kingdom (295 - 383 CE);

The Salihid Phylarchate (117 - 383 CE) and the Salihid Kingdom (383 - 498 CE);

Banu Ghassan (220 - 502 CE), the Ghassanid Phylarchate (502 - 529 CE), and the Ghassanid Kingdom (529 - 712 CE)

Red Sea Coastal Peoples

Huteimi/Hutaym & Solluba (400 BCE - 630 CE)

 

CENTRAL ARABIA

Najd/Nejd Plateau, Yamamah Steppe, Dahna Desert, and the Great Arabian Desert

Kahlans

AZDI—Banu Azd Uman (200 - 637 CE); Banu Azd Daba (115 BCE - 575 CE); Banu Aws (300 - 622 CE);

Banu Khazraj (300 - 622 CE); Banu Khuza'a (200 - 627 CE)

HAMADANS—Banu Tayy (106 - 630 CE); Banu Lakhm (100 - 294 CE) and the Lakhmid Kingdom (295 - 602 CE)

KINDAH—Banu Kindah (200 - 425 CE) and the Kindite Kingdom (425 - 540 CE); Banu Asad (540 - 680 CE);

Banu Taghlib (540 - 670 CE); Banu Kinanah (540 - 627 CE); Banu Bekr/Bakr (540 - 633 CE);

Banu Ka'ab/Ka'b (540 - 632 CE); Banu Hilal (540 - 969 CE); Banu Uqayl (540 - 629 CE)

Adnanites

Banu Ghatafan (106 BCE - 629 CE); Banu Shayban (400 BCE - 632 CE); Banu Amir (400 BCE - 629 CE);

Banu Sulaym (106 - 632 CE); Banu Kilab (550 - 631 CE); Banu Hawazin/Hawazan (106 - 632 CE);

Banu Hanifa (106 - 627 CE); Banu Annizah/Anizah/Aniza (400 BCE - 661 CE); Banu Tamim (115 - 631 CE);

Banu Abdul Qays (115 BCE - 632 CE); Banu Kalb (106 - 626 CE)

 

SOUTHERN ARABIA

Qahtan/Yaman (Yemen) & Tihamah (southern Red Sea coastal plain and highlands)

Qahtanites

Sabaean Kingdom (1000/410 BCE - 25 BCE & 100 - 280 CE) and the Raydanite Kingdom (25 BCE - 100 CE);

Minaean Kingdom (900/410 - 300 BCE & 190 - 50 BCE); Hadramite Kingdom (1000/410 BCE - 235 CE);

Qatabanian Kingdom (850/410 BCE - 335 BCE & 200 BCE - 150 CE); Himyarite Kingdom (110 - 25 BCE & 100 - 528 CE); Axumite Yaman (528 - 570 CE); Persian Marzubanate of Yaman (570 - 628 CE); Thamudic Peoples (715 BCE - 637 CE)

Adnanites (Tihama)

City-state of Yathrib/Medina (50 BCE - 622 CE) and the Banu Qaynuqa, Banu Qurayza, and Banu Nadir;

City-state of Makkah/Mecca (50 BCE - 629 CE) and the Banu Quraysh/Kuraish and Banu Daws;

City-state of Ta'if (50 BCE - 630 CE) and the Banu Harith, Banu Kinanah, and Banu Thaqif

Erythraean/Arabian Sea Coastal Peoples

Mehri/Mahri (400 BCE - 630 CE)

 

EASTERN ARABIA

Bahrayn (Persian Gulf coast and islands) and Magan/Makkan (the Oman Peninsula)

Bahrayn

Kingdom of Hagar/Gerrha (650/400 BCE - 300 CE); Kingdom of Charakene (127 BCE - 222 CE);

Persian Marzubanate of Meshan/Maishan (325 - 637 CE) 

Magan/Makkan

Satrapy of Maka (539 - 323 BCE); Kingdom of Maketa (323 BCE - 222 CE);

Persian Marzubanate of Mazun (222 - 628 CE)

 

This gallery and these notes are devoted to the military systems of pre-Islamic Arabia from the time of the introduction of cavalry warfare to the peninsula (ca. 400-200 BCE) until the early Islamic conquests (ca. 622-783 CE) of the Prophet Muhammad and his successors. Although for ease of reference I have divided the pre-Islamic Arabs into four socio-cultural and geopolitical regions (i.e., northern, central, eastern, and southern), please keep in mind that there was considerable cultural overlap, some tribes migrated between regions during different periods, some particularly large federations had branches in different parts of the peninsula, and the military systems of each grouping shared broad characteristics with the others. Nevertheless, Arabia and its peoples have too often been homogenized in both western and Islamic historiographical traditions, something that continues into the politics of today, and I think it is important to recognize that the people we refer to collectively as “Arabs” were/are in point of fact internally divided into a rich mosaic of distinct groups, and the Pre-Islamic Period is best seen as a period of ethnogenesis in which perceptions of shared Arabic identity were first taking shape (i.e., Arabization). In particular, the Pre-Islamic Arabians were worshippers of traditional animistic polytheism (i.e., pagans), Judaism, Christianity, and Mazdaism (and some of these religions persist in Arab minority communities to this day). In addition, there were parts of the Arabian Peninsula that were inhabited by pre-Semitic/pre-Hamitic indigenous peoples descended from Neolithic populations (e.g., the Huteimi/Hutaymi, Solluba, and Mehri peoples); there were divisions between Hamitic, Semitic, Arabo-Aramaean, and Perso-Arabian cultural-linguistic groups; the importance of trade through the region meant that there were often sizeable and influential communities of foreign merchants (e.g., Aramaeans, Judaeans, Kushitic peoples, Indo-Aryans, Persians, Greeks, and Romans) that chose to settle in various parts of the Arabian Peninsula; and significant portions of the peninsula were sometimes subjected to foreign domination (e.g., the Persian Empire in eastern and southern Arabia, the Axumite/Aksumite Empire in southern and western Arabia, and the Greeks and Romans in northern, eastern, and western Arabia), which further introduced foreign ideas, soldiers, and traders that affected the formation of Arab identity. Finally, one of the fundamental divisions was between the nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples of the open steppe and deep desert regions (Arabic, badawi, usually rendered as “Bedouins” in English today) and the agricultural and sometimes urbanized oasis-dwellers, highland tribes, and citizens of the coastal kingdoms. Although some of the states whose military systems are covered by this gallery have a history that predates my chosen start date (particularly the great kingdoms of Qahtan/Yaman), the introduction of cavalry warfare was revolutionary and warrants treating the subsequent period of military history as a distinct period. However, it should be noted that a revolution in the martial arts does not necessarily imply broad shifts in political, economic, and/or social systems.

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Strategically, most of the peoples of the pre-Islamic Arabian Peninsula were concerned with, at best, regional hegemony and tribal security. The importance of trade to the more-settled, more-urban, and agrarian civilizations of the oases and coasts meant that these societies tended to lead the way when it came to the creation (or attempt to create) pan-tribal political federations (asabiyah), kingdoms (malakut), or city-states (hadir) that could prevent major disruptions of trade networks. The great southern highland and coastal kingdoms—Saba, Ma’in, Qataban, Hadramawt, and Himyar—as well as the eastern coastal kingdoms—Gerrha and Maketa—had far-reaching strategic interests aimed both at securing a dominant position in trade with Persia, the Hellenistic states of Syria and Palestine, the Kushitic peoples of East Africa, the Indo-Aryans of India, and the Roman Empire. They also had the most socially stratified societies, including bureaucratic administrators and professional soldiers, and it is in the southern kingdoms in particular that we most-often see large-scale warfare—campaigns of conquest and/or to secure resources or trade routes. Set against this was the tendency of the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes to carry out gazawan (Arabic, “raiding,” often transliterated in French and English as razzia)—against each other, the settled peoples, and the trade caravans—especially in times of shortage and need (a perpetual possibility in an often harsh and unforgiving topographical landscape). The importance of kin-based social systems and codes of honor (muruwwa) practiced by many of the peoples of the pre-Islamic Arabian Peninsula also meant that these raids, social offenses committed by even one member of one lineage against another, or the breaking of a cultic taboo or religious prohibition could lead to serious, sometimes decades-long, feuds and inter-tribal warfare. Nevertheless, most nomadic and semi-nomadic groups recognized the importance of regional trade as a potential source of greater material security, and throughout this period there was a tendency amongst the nomadic and semi-nomadic groups to form into coalitions or federations of tribes that could secure access to the wealth that flowed back and forth across their land by providing safe passage to caravans and traders in return for tribute, by developing close kinship ties with the oasis/agrarian/urban folk and thereby actively participating in the socio-economic activities of these communities, or by setting themselves up as political powers in their own right that could treat with foreign states directly. Federations were often based on extended kin groups identified by adding banu, bani, or beni (literally, “children of,” but meaning “descended from”) to the nomenclature identifying a federation, which recognized the distant kinship of the associated tribes (ashira) and clans (al) to a common progenitor, thus stressing the importance of kinship as a basis for alliance (sometimes these ties of kinship were rather artfully contrived in order to legitimate political expediency). The progenitor was usually a powerful and/or righteous chief (sayyid/sheikh/shaykh), although these genealogies and the progenitors of the line were sometimes mythical in nature.

 

Added to the strategic dimensions of pre-Islamic Arabian society was the intervention of foreign powers in the region, including the occasional shift of trade routes to follow different paths, often in response to geopolitical shifts outside the Arabian Peninsula. In particular, improvements in ship technology and growing knowledge of the geography of the Arabian Peninsula and the surrounding bodies of water acquired by Hellenistic Syrian and Romanized Mediterranean traders led to the development of long-distance shipping that had, by the first century CE, eclipsed the importance of the overland caravans, leading to decreased prosperity for those states that had developed to dominate these routes (e.g., Nabataea, Lihyan, Saba, Ma’in, and Hadramawt). Additionally, the long struggle for supremacy in Syria-Mesopotamia fought between the Roman Empire and the Arsakid and Sassanid dynasties of Persia (ca. 92 BCE-629 CE) led to the eventual demise of the Hellenistic Syrian states as both empires tried to secure more-direct control of their respective frontier regions. As the borders were pushed further out into the deserts both empires sought to foster the development of larger and more centralized Arab polities amongst the nomadic tribes of the northern and eastern peninsula (e.g., the Tanukhids, Salihids, Ghassanids, and Lakhmids) through monetary subsidies, religious proselytization, and mutual military aid. The Himyarites of southern Arabia made a similar play for power in central Arabia via their support of the Kindite Kingdom. Finally, various Mesopotamian (Kassite, Babylonian, Assyrian), Macedonian (Alexander and the Seleukids), Greco-Aramaic (Charakene), and Persian (Arsakid and Sassanid) states had long had an interest in extending their political and economic hegemony into Bahrayn-Magan, thus staking a claim to trade passing through the Persian Gulf from India and East Africa, and this often led to the foundation of foreign colonies in Bahrayn-Magan, the occasional extension of dominion over swathes of the coast and islands, and the eventual conquest of the entire region by the Sassanid Persians (ca. third to seventh centuries CE). This last development overlay an imperial political apparatus that subordinated local polities and transformed their strategic outlook. This became particularly significant when the Byzantines sought to extend their hegemony into Qahtan by supporting an invasion (ca. 528 CE) of the Himyarite Kingdom by their Axumite allies from East Africa (modern Eritrea and Ethiopia). The invasion was ostensibly to prevent the Himyarite king, who was Jewish, from continuing to persecute (and massacre) Christians in his kingdom, although there were definitely economic factors at stake (the conquest of Qahtan would give the Byzantine-Axumite alliance complete control over Red Sea trade, allowing the Byzantines to bypass the Persians when it came to trade with India). However, the resulting Axumite-Persian War (558-578 CE) led to the conquest of Qahtan/Yaman by the Sassanids (Yaman replaced Qahtan as the name of all southern Arabia during this period), which they held until the coming of Islam (ca. 628 CE). As with Bahrayn-Magan, the Persians again overlaid their own imperial bureaucracy on local institutions, but in both locales Persian administrative control seems to have been slight (the Persians subsidized local rulers favorable to their economic interests, and their governors and small garrisons in these regions often “went native”).

 

Tactically, pre-Islamic Arab armies differed slightly between the four regions I’ve outlined here due to different socio-political systems and economic factors, but there was a certain common thread that ran through the military systems of the entire peninsula, and that was the warbands of the badawi (Arabic, “nomads”). These tribal warbands could be found in virtually every army of the pre-Islamic Arabian Peninsula—in the north and central regions, they operated alone or in conjunction with other tribes’ warbands; in the north, east, west, and south they operated in conjunction with the armies fielded by the agrarian kingdoms, oasis-dwellers, and city-states (and these peoples sometimes returned the favor); and they often served as allies or mercenaries in the armies of foreign powers both within and outside Arabia. Additionally, as I mentioned above, the introduction of cavalry warfare had a transformative effect on the military systems discussed herein, although for those fans of Lawrence of Arabia (Horizon Pictures, 1962) and other highly romanticized portrayals of Arab warriors, which portray vast hordes of Arabs in flowing robes and head-cloths sweeping out of the desert on horses to overwhelm their enemies, you may find the reality less prosaic. Cavalry warfare was introduced to Mesopotamia, Syria, and the Levant much earlier (ca. 1800 BCE) than in northern Arabia (ca. 400 BCE), and it did not become widespread in southern Arabia until 200 BCE. Most Arab armies, before and after the introduction of cavalry, were composed of infantry. Camels were used primarily as transportation, warriors usually preferring to dismount to fight (falling into a class called “mounted infantry” by modern military historians), although there is some indication that Arab bowmen may have sometimes remained camel-mounted during combat to take advantage of the elevation provided by their seat atop the camel (i.e., it allowed them to fire over the heads of the bulk of their fellow warriors on foot). Arab infantry were also sometimes known to have their camels kneel (cush) so that the infantry (bowmen as well as other types) could use them as a shield in otherwise open terrain. Horses remained a rare luxury item throughout the Pre-Islamic Period, but it did allow wealthy nobles and successful tribal warriors to increase their military effectiveness through greater mobility and speed on a battlefield, and therefore to further set themselves apart from their fellows. This also gave Arabian armies greater tactical dimension that nevertheless fit in very well with traditional tactics that emphasized mobility combined with guile (karr-wa-farr, Arabic, “attack-and-withdraw”). However, although most pre-Islamic Arabian warriors were bowmen, this seems to have been considered primarily a weapon for hunting or for infantry (sometimes as a foil for cavalry)—the Syrians, Parthians, and Persians all fielded large numbers of horse archers, but none of the pre-Islamic Arabian societies adopted horse archery as a significant feature of their military system (later Islamic Arab armies did, but largely under the influence of the Turks). Why this is is a matter of debate—the most convincing argument I can make is that the traditional warfare of pre-Islamic Arabian elites emphasized hand-to-hand combat as most suitable/honorable (a not uncommon thing in ancient societies), and even after the introduction of horses to the peninsula, horses were usually only used by elites that could afford to keep them (remember that most of the peninsula was/is not suited for large-scale horse herds). This not only meant it was impossible to adopt cavalry warfare on a large scale, but what cavalry there was would have conformed to the martial traditions of elites, which emphasized a sudden (and preferably surprise) charge with lance or spear, sword, and axe, sometimes preceded with thrown spears/javelins/darts. The area where cavalry had the greatest tactical effect was in the way it allowed elites to outmaneuver and potentially outflank relatively ponderous infantry formations, or to make more-sudden charges on unprepared opponents. Indeed, Greco-Roman, Syrian, and Persian sources make it clear that Arab cavalry generally operated in two different kinds of tactical formations—armored lancers (called clibanarii in Latin sources, klibanophoroi in Greek sources, savaran in Persian sources, and aswaran in Arabic sources) and light cavalry skirmishers similar to late Roman/Early Byzantine “Illyrian” cavalry (i.e., spear and javelin-armed skirmishers). The lancers were usually fielded by the urban/oasis dwellers or the nobles and their retinues from the more powerful federations for set-piece battles, while the skirmishers tended to represent smaller nomad groups or the urban/oasis/nomad nobles utilizing karr-wa-farr tactics or engaging in gazawan.

 

As one might expect, nomad armies tended to be small, with a combination of camel-mounted infantry and—after 400 BCE in northern Arabia and after 200 BCE in southern Arabia—horse-mounted cavalry. Once cavalry was introduced, it became the specialty of the tribal nobles, chiefs, kings, and their retinues (among the nomads, a retinue was close kin, among the agrarian states these could be professional guards). This was sometimes supplemented with infantry skirmishers (mainly bowmen and slingers) and camp followers, usually when defending against an incursion into tribal territory or against a camp (hirat/hira). Indeed, in pre-Islamic Arabia, women sometimes fought alongside men, and had both a fierce and provocative reputation (e.g., there are stories of how they would encourage fighters from the sidelines of a battle by stripping naked and offering themselves to those fighters that proved their virility as warriors). The oasis-dwellers often lived in close proximity to the nomads, had the closest social and political dealings with them, and contributed an added dimension to nomad warfare. Unlike the nomads, who seem to have preferred spears or lances, and used sword, axe, and knife as side-arms, the oasis-dwellers seem to have preferred swords as the primary weapon among the nobles, with spears often being relegated to tribal levies. Like the nomads, the oasis-dwellers were often essentially mounted infantry, but whereas the nomads seem to have preferred rapid impetuous charges and tactical retreats, the oasis-dwellers tended to favor more static main-battle formations (similar to a phalanx or shield-wall). Longer, heavier swords also seem to have been more popular in and around the oases, particularly imported Persian swords—long, straight, double-edged swords, and a type of long, straight, single-edged sword (sabers and scimitars did not appear until the Islamic Period, first introduced by the Turks). Indeed, the Persians, whose primary military arm was cavalry, favored Arab infantry swordsmen as mercenaries. The oases were also usually the locations where foreigners resided in Arabia, mainly merchants and their guards (i.e., caravan guards). These were sometimes involved in local warfare, and not just to defend their economic interests (caravans and emporiums)—they often intermarried with local families and played a role in local society and politics. As with the nomads and oasis-dwellers, mounted infantry seems to have been the norm for caravan guards, although foreign military equipment would have been mixed with native equipment in such units, and bows seem to have been more popular (often defending caravans meant using bows and arrows to drive off potential marauders before they could get close enough to engage hand-to-hand). The northern Arab peoples would also have had access to Hellenistic Syrians as allies (e.g., Nabataea, Palmyra, Hatra, Charakene) until about 324 CE, Greco-Macedonian colonists (ca. 322-63 BCE), and eventually Roman/Byzantine border garrisons (ca. 63 BCE-712 CE). Each of these groups were known to carry out military operations beyond the official borders in support of friendly Arab tribes—not just large-scale alliances, but small operations with limited strategic goals (e.g., helping a friendly tribe wipe out a not-so-friendly tribe). These mercenary/allied units would provide additional tactical dimensions to the forces of their Arab allies. This meant heavy cavalry cataphracts, horse archers, and infantry bowmen from the Syrians; heavy cavalry (klibanophoroi) and infantry (thureophoroi) from the Greco-Macedonian colonists; and Roman border garrison cavalry (equites) and infantry (auxilia). The Lakhmids of southern Mesopotamia similarly counted on the support of the Sassanid Persians—from about 325 CE, there was a Persian garrison stationed at the Lakhmid capital at Hira that consisted of several units of Persian heavy cavalry (savaran) and infantry bowmen (kamanderan). Persian military support of the marzubanates (i.e., military border provinces) in Bahrayn/Meshan (ca. 325-637 CE), Magan/Mazun (ca. 222-628 CE), and Qahtan/Yaman (ca. 570-628 CE) was similar to that provided to the Lakhmids—a small garrison of heavy cavalry and infantry bowmen that supported the governor, as well as a small number of Persian land-owners/colonists, that basically only supplemented the native warriors of local rulers. Finally, the polities of southern Arabia, the Plain of Tihama, and the Hijaz also had access to Kushitic Axumite and Abyssinian mercenaries and allies. The southern Arabian Kingdom of Saba established trade colonies in the Kingdom of D’mt (980-400 BCE) as early as 700 BCE, but the East African presence in southern Arabia and Tihama was greatly accelerated during the period of Axumite dominance in East Africa (ca. 100-980 CE), especially after the Axumites established a large colony at Najran on the Plain of Tihama (ca. 400 CE) and, after this colony had been massacred by an Himyarite king, the Axumite invasion and occupation of Himyar (528-570 CE). Initially (ca. 700 BCE-100 CE), these East African mercenaries (ahabish) seem to have been primarily light infantry javelinmen (small round shield, no armor, spear, and javelins/darts with a short sword sidearm). Later Axumite mercenaries tended to be cavalry, heavy infantry, medium infantry, light infantry, and/or infantry bowmen. Early Axumite warriors were generally unarmored or lightly armored with padded leather jackets (qnat or meqennet)(ca. 100-970 CE), with mail (tsrur or dir’a hatsin) and helmets (qur) being used only by the wealthiest nobles (mail was not locally produced, but imported from Rome), but after 970 CE mail became both heavier and more prevalent in the cavalry and heavy infantry arms (as did helmets), both groups being dominated by nobles and their retinues. Cavalrymen generally carried a large round hide shield (welatw), a collection of light spears (quiyanw)—mainly for throwing—and one of several types of swords (asyft). The most distinctive sword of the Axumites and Abyssinians was the shotel, a sickle-like sword with an almost semicircular blade that could be used single- or two-handed, but they also had short straight-bladed and long straight-bladed swords. The main infantry arm, and the units most often found as mercenaries in Arabia, were essentially unarmored medium infantry skirmishers that carried either a large round hide shield or a smaller buckler-like version, and wielded spears, darts, and swords. Marines tended to be the best armed and trained, since they were generally not levies but more-or-less full-time mercenaries (similar to caravan guards). These could be organized as flexible main-battle infantry or as skirmishers. Similarly, unarmored infantry bowmen could be recruited, and could be mass archers or skirmishers. After the Axumites established their colony at Najran, and certainly after the Axumite invasion (many of the Axumite soldiers chose to settle down as colonists), heavy infantry would have joined the ranks of possible mercenaries. After about 970, at least a portion of each such unit would have been armored in mail or hardened leather (as well as the traditional padded jackets), and they would have added the axe and mace to their repertoire of weaponry, including the fearsome two-handed mace (up to 3 feet long) called a dembus or lutat. Most heavy infantry would have carried shields, but obviously the two-handed macemen probably wore heavier armor and left the shield at home. The Axumite viceroy of Yaman, Abraha al-Ashram (531-570 CE), used war elephants against the city-state of Makkah/Mecca in 570 CE, so it is likely that at least one of the two Axumite invasion armies that landed in southern Arabia (in 528 and 547 CE) brought war-elephants, although they all seem to have been killed along with Abraha at the siege of Makkah (subsequently in Islamic tradition, 570 CE was known as “the Year of the Elephant”), so at the most generous we can say elephants may have been featured in southern Arabian warfare from 528-570 CE. In part due to the influence of the Greeks, Romans, Persians, and Axumites, but more importantly due to the different topography of southern Arabia and Magan, as well as the rather late (ca. 200 BCE) introduction of cavalry warfare, the southern and eastern highland tribes seem to have had a slightly different tactical stance than those in northern and central Arabia. First, southern Arab camelry traditions seem to have emphasized fighting from camelback rather than dismounting to fight (and camelry became the arm of the nobility), and after the introduction of horse cavalry, the cavalry traditions of southern and eastern Arabia seem to have favored the influence of Persia (i.e., armored lancers until about 531 CE, and thereafter composite heavy cavalry, but always in very small numbers). Armor was more prevalent (particularly mail and hardened leather, but also lamellar), and shield designs (already discussed) were more varied. Finally, we are told by a number of sources that although the northern and central Arabians preferred to charge into hand-to-hand combat with spear/lance, sword, and axe, the southern and eastern highland infantry operated much more like Greek thureophoroi, Roman auxilia, and Axumite/Abyssinian medium and light infantry (i.e., skirmishing with javelins and using spear, sword, knife, axe, and mace as sidearms). This more measured approach to warfare had to have been dictated primarily by terrain, which in many places would have restricted the utility of cavalry and camelry (due to broken terrain), and where it was possible to stand off and pelt your enemy for an extended period of time before hand-to-hand engagement. This style of warfare was not well-suited to wide-open spaces, and so the southern kingdoms often relied heavily on nomad mercenaries when operating in the Sayhad, Dhofar, and Great Arabian desert regions. Similarly, infantry bowmen seem to have had greater significance in southern and eastern Arabia. This could explain why later Islamic tradition gives Muhammad credit with putting greater emphasis on use of the bow among his warriors—Muhammad was born and raised in Tihama, which was heavily influenced by southern Arabian martial traditions, and although by Muhammad’s time Tihama had been dominated by central Arabian nomadic tribes, it is likely that city-states like Yathrib/Medina, Makkah/Mecca, and Ta’if retained some of the martial traditions of the south.

 

The primary weapons of all pre-Islamic Arab armies were the lance/long spear, sword, javelins/darts, bow and arrows, sling and sling-stones, and axe, in descending order of importance. The most important metalworking centers were in Bahrayn-Magan and Qahtan/Yaman, although there were also centers of production in some of the major oasis city-states of the north and west, and there were itinerant clans of tinkers that specialized in the small-scale production and repair of metal implements and weapons (the badawi often held these tinkers in contempt, but there is no doubt that they found their services useful). Armor production (mostly mail and hardened leather) was also centered in Bahrayn-Magan and Qahtan/Yaman. This was due to the fact that most of the major ore deposits in the Arabian Peninsula lay in the highlands of the Oman Peninsula (the Hajar Mountains) and the mountains of southern Arabia (the Hadramawt and Haraz mountains), although it was also due to the import of high-quality ingots from abroad (especially Indian wootz steel and bamboo for the shafts of lances/spears and javelins/darts). Mail and scale (and later, lamellar) were also imported from Persia, Rome, and India, as were swords. Leather production of course relied on herds of cattle, and maintaining such herds was really only possible in the relatively wet regions of Bahrayn-Magan and Qahtan/Yaman. Arrow-shafts were usually of reed, which meant arrow production was also greatest in the south and east where there were wetlands, although in the north Mesopotamian, Syrian, Judaean, and Egyptian reed could be had. The most popular type of shield used throughout the peninsula was a round leather shield over a wicker frame, although in Bahrayn-Magan and Qahtan/Yaman hexagonal shields (likely wood, with a leather covering, bound around the edges and embossed in the center with bronze or iron, and sometimes with a central ridge of metal or wood) are sometimes pictured in period art. These look like variations of the Greek thureos or an undersized Roman scutum, which should not be totally surprising—Hellenistic influence was felt, mainly in Bahrayn-Magan and Qahtan, from the time of the naval expeditions of Alexander’s admiral (navarch), Nearchos (360-300 BCE), to explore the eastern Arabian Sea coast and the Persian Gulf (ca. 326-324 BCE), although this influence likely grew due to the commercial exploits of later Hellenistic Syrian traders, particularly those of Charakene/Mesene (ca. 127 BCE-222 CE). The Romans established a presence in Qahtan as early as the first century BCE, with the disastrous expedition (ca. 26-24 BCE) of the prefect of Egypt, Gaius Aelius Gallus, who was acting on the orders of emperor Octavius Augustus. Although this initial Roman military probe into Arabia was repulsed, later Roman traders were more successful, and in subsequent centuries the Romans under emperor Trajan managed to push their hegemony into the Hejaz as far south as the oasis-city of Hegra (ca. 113-117 CE). From then until the rise of Islam the Romans and their Byzantine successors continued to expand their political and commercial interests in the region of the Red Sea and southern Arabia, ultimately leading to the Axumite-Persian Wars (ca. 528-570 CE). Certainly, in addition to locally made weapons and armor, the pre-Islamic Arabians also imported martial equipment. In addition to raw materials from India, Indian mail, scale, and swords were popular in Bahrayn-Magan and Qahtan/Yaman; Persian mail, helmets, and swords were popular in the eastern and central regions of the peninsula, as well as along the Mesopotamian frontier; and the Hellenistic Syrians and Romans mainly exported mail, helmets, swords, and composite bows to northern Arabia and Qahtan. Metal helmets and axes seem to have been rare commodities, used only by kings (malik, melik, melekh, malka, or mukarrib), chiefs (sayyid, sheikh, or shayk), nobles (sharif) and their retinues (especially amongst the heavy cavalry). Everyone else was either bareheaded, wore some form of head covering (turban, scarf, or cap, with only the turban providing a small degree of protection), or wore hardened leather helmets (sometimes with metal or horn plaques sewn on).

Standard pre-Islamic Arabian costume was similar to the modern Ihram clothing worn by Muslims when on pilgrimage (Hajj or umrah), consisting of a body wrap for the lower body (izar) from waist to calves or ankles that was secured around the waist by a belt or sash (similar to an Indonesian sarong) or just tied above the hips, and an upper drape (rida) that could be worn various ways, but normally was draped over the left shoulder and wrapped around the upper body in a way that left the right arm completely free, similar to a Greek himation (Arab warriors are also sometimes shown with it rolled up and slung over the left shoulder with the ends tied together over the right hip, leaving most of the upper body bare). Today, both items are white (symbolizing the purity of a pilgrim), but during the pre-Islamic period a broader color-palette was used (from locally produced and imported cloth). Greco-Roman style tunics (chiton or tunica) and cloaks (chlamys or pallium) and knee-length trousers (braca/bracca) were also worn, especially in northern, western, and southern Arabia, and full-length Persian trousers (sirwal) were sometimes worn by groups in the central and eastern regions (and in the south following the Sassanian conquest of Himyar). In addition to the thick turban/head wrap (imama), there were a number of other forms of head coverings, including a head-shawl (tallit) worn by Arab Jews, a Syrian cap (tartur) worn by Arabo-Aramaean peoples (mainly in the north and east), and a draped head cloth (keffiyah) secured to the head with cord or a strip of cloth, the color or patterning of the cloth of the keffiyah often denoting tribal or cultic affiliations. In Greek, Roman, and Persian art in particular, but also in some native Arabian art, pre-Islamic Arabs are also often shown bare-headed (with either long strait hair or something that looks like a kinky-haired "natural")—it has been suggested that this may have distinguished urban/oasis/highland peoples from nomads or semi-nomadic peoples, but that is highly conjectural (although a convenient visual shorthand). Taken altogether, this gives one quite a bit of latitude when portraying the pre-Islamic Arabs, although one can certainly see the roots of later Islamic dress codes in some of the pre-Islamic clothing styles. The figures I've used here are a mix of Museum and Essex miniatures, with banners and shield designs from Little Big Men Studios. I've modeled these figures to represent the later Christian Arab states of the Tanukhids, Salihids, Ghassanids, and/or Lakhmids.