PALMYRA (312 BCE - 14 CE)

Tedmurta (Aramaic), Tadmor (Arabic),

 Palamepolis (Greek), Palmyra (Latin) (“City of palm trees”)

Kingdom (312 BCE - 14 CE); Roman Protectorate (14 - 264 CE);

Empire of Palmyra (264 - 273 CE)

 

The city-state of Palmyra was an Arab, Aramaean, and Amorite settlement located in what is today central Syria, in the eastern area of the Homs Governorate. Emesa lay to the west, the Hauran Desert and Nabataea lay to the south, Osrohene lay to the north, and to the east lay the Syrian Desert and Hatra. Palmyra dominated one of the primary oases along the trade route that led from Upper Mesopotamia across the Syrian Desert to Emesa, where goods were generally transferred to barges on the Orontes River, and from there they would be shipped to Antioch (Syria's primary trans-shipment port for goods intended for Mediterranean markets). Although Emesa to the west was a major cult center for a traditional Arabo-Aramaean solar deity (Gabal), Palmyra developed into a much more cosmopolitan city with a broad syncretic pantheon that included Syrian, Hellenistic, Mesopotamian, and eventually Romanized deities. Palmyra grew immensely wealthy from trade, and Palmyrene merchants could be found operating throughout southwestern Asia and the eastern Mediterranean. Tadmor/Tedmurta was a seasonal camp for Arab tribes located adjacent to the oasis of Efqa. During the Late Bronze Age Collapse (1206-1150 BCE) and the period of the Neo-Assyrian Empire (911-605 BCE), the area also saw settlement by Aramaean merchants and colonists, and Aramaic became the primary language. During the Hellenistic period the settlement acquired the name, Palmyra, and it was expanded into a Hellenistic-model city (polis) under the patronage of the Seleukid Empire (ca. 312-64 BCE). During this period, the Seleukids' Amorite allies were able to establish a presence in Palmyra. As the Seleukid Empire crumbled in the face of the expansion of the Parthians in the east (ca. 148-129 BCE), and the Romans in the west (192-64 BCE), Palmyra became increasingly independent, and when Rome finally annexed what was left of the Seleukid state in Syria (ca. 64-63 BCE), Palmyra initially emerged as an independent state. Subsequently, Marc Antony may have made a failed attempt to add it to Rome's growing Syrian dominions in 41 BCE, although it was not until the reign of emperor Tiberius (14-37 CE) that Rome was able to annex Palmyra (ca. 19 CE)—it was then folded into the Roman province of Syria (ca. 19-129 CE). Despite annexation, Palmyra was accorded a privileged status that allowed its civic council (boule) of local magnates to run it as a semi-independent client-state (Palmyra's aristocrats were mostly Arabo-Aramaean sheikhs with ties to the tribes of the chora—the territory controlled by the city—but also Aramaized Amorite townsmen  and Greek colonists). The Romans purposely expanded the territories under the governorship of the Palmyrene council to include most of eastern Roman Syria, and Palmyra became the linchpin of Rome's frontier defenses in the Syrian Desert, as well as the official entrepôt for caravans wishing to enter the empire from Mesopotamia (a string of outposts were established along the Euphrates to the east, which funneled caravans toward Palmyra). The emperor Hadrian (117-138 CE) visited Palmyra in 129 CE, as part of his great tour through the Roman Empire, and was so impressed with Palmyra's wealth and loyalty to Rome that he declared it a civitas libera (Latin, “free city”) and endowed several major building projects to improve local infrastructure. It was granted the status of a Roman colony (colonia) in 211 CE under the Severan Dynasty (this was the highest status accorded a city in the Roman administration). The population of Palmyra grew to around 60,000 inhabitants during the Seleukid period, and at the height of the Palmyrene Empire (see below) it reached 150,000 (by contrast, contemporary Rome had around 1 million inhabitants, Roman Alexandria had about 500,000, Antioch about 400,000, and Jerusalem around 100,000, while Lugdunum—the largest western Roman city besides Rome—had about 80,000). Palmyra's size is all the more astonishing when one considers that, unlike the other cities on my short list, it was located in the middle of the desert. In the first and second centuries CE, Palmyra's participation in the wars of Rome with its Parthian, and then Sassanid Persian, neighbors led away from the rule of a council to the rule of a king—the need for a strong army commander who could marshal the resources of the state led to the development of an elected office, called the ras (Aramaic, “lord”) of Palmyra, who operated similarly to the ancient Greek office of tyrannos (Greek, “ruler [of a polis]”). From there, it was a short jump to a monarchy.

 

It was the Palmyrene ruler Udaynath bar Hairanes (220-267 CE), whose Latin name was Lucius Septimius Odenathus (indicating that his family gained Roman citizenship under the patronage of the Severan Dynasty), that took the final step of transforming the executive position of ras into a kingship (malik) on the Arabo-Aramaean model, although the influence of Hellenistic institutions remained strong in the Palmyrene state. The rise of the Sassanids (ca. 205-310 CE) transformed the nature of the challenge posed by the perennial conflict between the Greco-Roman and Partho-Persian worlds. The Sassanids carried out a zealous program of Persicization throughout their empire that included a purge of foreign merchants, the restructuring of society along Avestan principles (e.g., a caste system and aggressive Mazdayan proselytization), and the development of a much higher degree of centralized bureaucratic control of the empire than had been the norm under the Seleukid and Arsakid dynasties. This meant an end to the autonomy of the eastern Hellenized Syrian states, many of whom were trade partners and/or competitors of Palmyra, the expulsion of western merchants from Persian trade centers (the prominence of the Palmyrenes made them prime targets), and the imposition of a heavy tax burden on trade that crossed Sassanian borders. In addition, the Sassanids embarked on an aggressive campaign to retake territories formerly belonging to Persia under the Achaemenid Dynasty, specifically including Syria, and this situation became critically acute when the authority and power of the Roman government declined during the Third Century Crisis (235-284 CE)—a confluence of internal discord, imperial financial mismanagement, natural disasters (earthquakes, famine, plague), and social transformation that almost led to the collapse of the Roman Empire. When the Sassanian shahenshah (Middle Persian, “king-of-kings,” i.e., emperor) Shapur I (240-270 CE) led a major invasion of Roman Syria in 252-253 CE, he was taking advantage of both an invasion of Roman Anatolia by the Goths and a widespread outbreak of plague (probably Bubonic Plague) in the Roman Empire—the father-and-son co-emperors Valerian and Gallienus had also carried out persecutions against the Christian sect, creating social turmoil. Taken together, Shapur rightly calculated the Roman emperors would prove unable to react to his attack in a timely manner, leaving only border troops to resist him. Nevertheless, Shapur's invasion seems at this point to have been a kind of reconnaissance-in-force/plundering expedition aimed primarily at probing Rome's Syrian defenses and seizing booty (not occupying territory). Shapur struck first in northern Syria-upper Mesopotamia, against Osrohene and Antioch, which allowed the priest-king of Emesa (Uranius Antoninus) and Odenathus, Lord of Palmyra, to marshal their personal guard troops, call up their civic militias, and organize local Roman border troops and nomadic Arab allies. Roman border troops in Osrohene, Armenia, and northern Syria were routed, and the great city of Antioch, on the Orontes River, fell to Shapur (who sacked it, but did not attempt to occupy it). However, when Persian forces then attempted to take Emesa to the south, they found Uranius better prepared, and the Emesan priest-king managed a stout defense that forced the Persians to give up on Emesa. By that time, the emperor Valerian (253-260 CE) had also achieved victory over the Goths and could be expected to march on Syria, so Shapur contented himself with marching back toward the Euphrates with his spoils. However, Odenathus led an army out of Palmyra intent on intercepting the Persians, and he ambushed the overconfident Shapur as his army neared the Euphrates. Shapur was defeated, forced to abandon much of his loot, and made an ignominious retreat across the Euphrates. As a reward, Valerian granted Odenathus the title of legatus (i.e., governor-general) of the province of Syria-Phoenice (he was already of consular rank), but in retaliation the Persians destroyed a number of Palmyrene outposts in eastern Syria (ca. 253-256 CE). The remains of one of these, the caravanserai town of Dura Europos, has produced remarkably well-preserved archeological finds that have provided modern archeologists and historians with a glimpse into some of the details of frontier life for Romano-Syrian garrison troops.

 

Shapur remained undaunted and again marched into Osrohene a few years later (260 CE), where he faced off against Valerian at the Battle of Edessa (sometimes called the Second Battle of Carrhae)—the Roman army was utterly destroyed (as many as 70,000 casualties, but a good number of these were likely captured and enslaved rather than killed), and to complete the disaster, emperor Valerian was captured by the Persians. The Roman prisoners are believed to have been settled as military colonists on the far side of the Persian Empire (Bishapur, southern Iran), while Valerian faced a grisly fate—he was kept in a cage, taken out and forced to endure various humiliations to entertain Shapur and his court (e.g., he was forced to serve as a mounting block for Shapur), and he was eventually tortured to death (254 CE), his body skinned and stuffed with manure-soaked straw from Shapur's stables, and displayed in the Persian capital (Ctesiphon/Tisfon). Valerian's son and co-emperor, Gallienus (253-268 CE), was at the time faced with several revolts in the western empire, as well as two major Germanic invasions (the Alamanni and Heruli), and while Gallienus attempted to secure the western empire Shapur followed up his victory at Edessa by capturing Roman Cappadocia, Cilicia, and northern Syria (Antioch was again sacked). In the eastern empire, the remnants of Valerian's army rallied to the banner of Fulvius Macrianus (Valerian's Count of the Treasury) and his son, Quietus, with the support of Valerian's Syrian Prefect, Callistus—in a sad statement about the political state of Rome at that time, they did not rally to repel Shapur and the Persians, but instead withdrew through Anatolia and crossed over into the Balkans with the intention of marching on Rome to oust Gallienus. They were defeated by Aureolis, Gallienus' magister equituum (Latin, “master of horse”)—Fulvius Macrianus was killed in battle, and Quietus Macrianus and Callistus fled to Emesa (Aureolis subsequently also led a revolt against Gallienus). Odenathus marched on Emesa, defeated Quietus and Callistus (both were killed), rallied what Roman troops were left in the region, and once again managed to intercept Shapur while he was marching back to Persian territory laden down with booty. Once again, Shapur was surprised while waiting to cross the Euphrates and defeated, although Shapur again escaped. Gallienus continued to face opposition in the west and also in Egypt (Lucius Mussius Aemelianus, Prefect of Egypt, had supported the Macriani), and he clearly recognized that Odenathus was his only hope to restore Roman power in Anatolia and Syria—Odenathus was granted two titles that in effect made him something akin to a Roman viceroy (Dux Romanorum, “Commander of Rome,” and Corrector totis Orientis, “Bringer of Order to all the East”). Odenathus acted quickly to drive out the Persian garrisons that Shapur had left in Cappadocia, Cilicia, and northern Syria, and to reorganize the defenses of Rome's eastern provinces (Gallienus defeated Aemilianus in Egypt). Not content to stay on the defensive, Odenathus then launched an invasion of the Persian Empire (262-263 CE). He marched deep into Mesopotamia but ultimately failed to take the Persian capital of Tisfon (spelled as “Ctesiphon” in Greek sources) or to effect the release of Valerian, although he and his army returned to Palmyra loaded down with a massive amount of Persian treasure (he did not attempt to occupy any Persian territory). Gallienus granted him the title Persicus Maximus (“Greater than the Persians”) and held a Triumph in Rome in his honor.

 

Odenathus may have been acclaimed by his troops as Imperator totis Orientis (“Conquerer of the East”), although there is no evidence he officially assumed this title (e.g., none of his inscriptions so proclaim him), and his supposed assumption of the title Malikmalik (Syriac, “King-of-kings”) is actually based on the fact that he was posthumously accorded this title in inscriptions erected by Zenobia and Vaballathus (see below). Although it is the etymological root form of the modern English word “emperor,” in Roman parlance the title of imperator (literally, “conqueror”) had been used since the Republic as an acclamation by Roman troops for a victorious commander—while it is true that during the period of the Roman autocracy this acclamation was increasingly reserved for the emperor, the primary imperial titles were Augustus and princeps, and imperator was still sometimes used in reference to particularly successful generals (although it often aroused the paranoia of the emperor because during the Later Principate particularly successful generals often turned into usurpers). The Historia Augusta, a mid-fourth century Latin-language historical compilation, is unfortunately one of the few primary sources for the Third Century Crisis, and it is from this source that many modern historiographical theories regarding the reigns of Odenathus and his wife (see below) are taken, including the theory that Odenathus declared independence from Rome (and his acclamation as imperator is offered as evidence). Although it is an entertaining read, due to the fact that it is full of gossipy anecdotes, much of the Historia Augusta has been shown to be false, and it is today usually regarded as unreliable. Gallienus was in no position to oppose Odenathus, so his apparent support of Odenathus as a colleague may be suspect, but there is no evidence to contradict Odenathus' apparently genuine desire to preserve Roman power in the eastern empire. Indeed, he acted as an instrument of that socio-political system and at most may have seen himself as Gallienus' colleague emperor, not the ruler of an autonomous state. By that time, all free denizens of the empire had been granted citizenship, and Roman Syria had recently spawned an imperial dynasty—the Severans (193-235 CE)—by whose patronage Odenathus' own family seems to have risen to prominence. Syrian solar worship, coupled with neo-Platonic philosophy and other eastern cults (e.g., Christianity, Mithraism, and worship of the Queen of Heaven) had gained traction throughout the empire, and was soon to form the cornerstone of imperial ideology during the reunification of the empire under the Illyrian Dynasty (268-305 CE). The idea of splitting the empire into two administrative halves—east and west—which was also to become a cornerstone of the Illyrian Dynasty, had also already gained traction, notably under Valerian and Gallienus. Most tellingly, Odenathus never marched on Rome, never supported any of the other numerous revolts of the period, and indeed stamped out the remnants of the Macriani Revolt. With the apparent acquiescence of Gallienus, Odenathus' dominion included Arabia Petraea (Nabataea and Auranitis) and Judaea (including Ituraea and Samaria) in the south, all of Roman Syria, and Cappadocia, Pontus, Cilicia, Galatia, and Bithynia in Anatolia, in effect making Odenathus eastern emperor from about 264 CE, whether or not he actually assumed the title. No one knows for certain what his ultimate plans may have been, however, because in late 267 or early 268 CE he and his eldest son and intended heir, Hairanes bar Udaynath (often Latinized as Hairan), were assassinated.

 

There were several conspiracy theories regarding Odenathus' assassination put forward by ancient authors, but they do not agree on key details—the most popular was that provided in the Historia Augusta implicating his second wife, Zenobia bat Zabbai, but a more reliable source for the period (Zonoras) states that Odenathus was killed by his cousin Maeonius, who had been humiliated by Odenathus due to a breach of etiquette on the part of Maeonius. While hunting together, Maeonius had thrown his spear at the quarry first, and thus made the kill, but etiquette demanded that that right was due to his cousin and lord, Odenathus. So Odenathus rode up to Maeonius after the kill, grabbed him by his sword belt, and unhorsed him. In Persian and Syrian culture, this was an accepted way for a warrior to reassert his dominance over an overweening man of lesser rank, forcing that man to decide whether to press a real challenge or submit—the challenge usually took the form of a duel, but Zonoras states that Maeonius made a show of submission and then put together a cabal of disgruntled men who later surprised and surrounded Odenathus and Hairan and cut them down. Odenathus' second wife, Zenobia bat Zabbai/Julia Aurelia Zenobia (240-275 CE), had the most to gain, and she certainly could have acted through Maeonius as some modern historians have suggested, but this is equally possible for Gallienus (if he was indeed angry/paranoid over Odenathus' acclamation as imperator) or for one of the other Roman governors in Syria (who were jealous of Odenathus' growing power and prestige). We simply do not know whether Maeonius acted alone or with someone's complicity or even whether he was in fact the assassin. Hairan's mother was Odenathus' first wife (her name is unknown, although she is believed to have been Persian), who may have died in childbirth, and with Zenobia's husband and his eldest son by another wife dead, Zenobia's eldest son by Odenathus, Lucius Julius Aurelius Septimius Vaballathus Athenodorus (267-273 CE), stood as Odenathus' heir (his name is rendered as Wahballath, “Gift of Allat,” in Aramaic). Vaballathus was either an infant or a young teen at the time of Odenathus' assassination (and he may or may not have had two younger brothers), and Palmyra's tradition of inherited executive power was in its infancy, but Zenobia was a remarkable woman. She moved quickly to gain the support of the Palmyrene council for Vaballathus' succession, and to accept her as regent. She had Maeonius summarily executed (no trial), and Odenathus' castellan (Vorodes/Worod) either liquidated or sidelined (268 CE), which certainly fed the suspicions that she was involved in her husband's assassination. She used her late husband's amassed treasure to embellish the city of Palmyra, to build up its army, and to create a vibrant Hellenistic court (philosophers, artists, and musicians from all over the east were offered comfortable positions at her court).

 

It is unfortunate that the sad state of the historical record tells us little about the nature of the Palmyrene Empire, or the circumstances under which it was formed and ruled. I have herein made the argument that Odenathus likely considered himself as eastern Roman emperor, and that the idea that he seceded from the empire is likely false. We are equally unsure of the motives of Zenobia—although her reign, on behalf of her son, ultimately led to open conflict with Rome, there is some indication she may have initially only had her eyes set on elevating Vaballathus to his father's position as Roman viceroy or eastern emperor, but that the antipathy of the western Roman court forced her (and Vaballathus) into assuming a more belligerent secessionist stance. Zenobia is usually treated in modern histories as the ruler of the Palmyrene Empire after the death of her husband—as we shall see, Vaballathus has a nebulous presence in the history of the period, and although he is attested in inscriptions and coinage, it is obvious from the histories that he did not play a central role in the events of his reign (several sources claim he was an infant at the time of his accession, in which case he would only have been seven or eight by the end of his empire, although there is some evidence he may have been as old as 14 when his father was assassinated, in which case he would have reached majority before the empire ended, and it is therefore perplexing that he does not have a stronger presence in the sources). Zenobia was the daughter of Zabbai, a sheikh of the Amila el-Amaliki tribe (one of the many Aramaized Arab tribes of Palmyra's chora), although she always claimed descent from Cleopatra VII Philopater of Egypt. This is not as unlikely as it seems—Antiochus IV Epiphanes (175-64 BCE), ruler of Syria, was married to Cleopatra Thea, daughter of Ptolemy VI Philometor of Egypt, and it is known that several male members of Zenobia's extended family bore the name Antiochus (indicating a possible family connection to Antiochus IV, although it could simply have been a patron-client relationship). Zenobia's father, Zabbai, is believed to have died fighting the Tanukh in 224 CE (this was a nomadic Arab tribe from the Nefud Desert that was encroaching on Palmyra at this time), although one of her two top generals (Zabdas and Zabbai) shared the name of her father, and it is possible he may actually have been her father (which means he would have survived until about 272-273 CE). From 267 to 269 CE Zenobia consolidated her position in Syria, establishing regional hegemony over the provinces of Roman Mesopotamia, Syria Coele, Phoenicia, Arabia Petraea, and Palaestina. In 269 CE she sent her general, Zabdas, to conquer Egypt, a bold and provocative move that is sometimes viewed as her declaration of independence, although it could just as easily have been a gambit to force recognition out of the western imperial court (the city of Rome got as much as a quarter of its total annual grain imports from Egypt). Gallienus had been assassinated in 268, his entire family had been slaughtered by the conspirators, and his successor Claudius II (268-270 CE) spent most of his short reign fighting the Goths, Alamanni, and Vandals before succumbing to the plague. With the western emperor again heavily engaged against barbarians, another rebellion had arisen in Egypt under an otherwise unknown leader named Timagenes, and Zabdas' army apparently moved into Egypt in support of this rebellion (although Timagenes disappears from the historical record thereafter, indicating that Zenobia may actually have sent Zabdas into Egypt to quell the rebellion). One further complication was the actions of a Roman admiral named Tenagino Probus, who had been operating in the eastern Mediterranean against pirates at the time of Zabdas' invasion of Egypt. Tenagino landed with his troops in Alexandria, where he drove out the rebels there, but then attempted to intercept the Palmyrene army (which had apparently marched on Memphis). Tenagino was defeated and killed by Zabdas. The conflict between Zabdas and Tenagino may have been a misunderstanding, but it is usually used as evidence to indicate that Zenobia had intended to invade Egypt, not liberate it from the rebels. Claudius II died soon thereafter (270), and his brother and successor, Quintillus, only lasted a few months (he was either killed in a coup, died of plague like his brother, or committed suicide, depending on the historical source). Also by this time, one of the many rebels against whom Gallienus had fought, Marcus Cassianius Latinius Postumus (260-269 CE), had successfully broken away from Rome to form the short-lived Gallic Empire (260-274 CE), but with the death of Quintillus the western empire finally got an emperor who was made of sterner stuff than his third century predecessors, and the reign of Lucius Domitius Aurelianus, known as Aurelian (270-275 CE), would prove to be the starting point for the reunification and rejuvenation of the Roman Empire.

 

It is still unclear whether Zenobia considered herself independent of Rome—there is no evidence that she attempted to cut off grain shipments from Egypt to Rome until 272 CE (although the threat would have been implicit), at which time Aurelian had already begun his invasion of the Palmyrene Empire, and after her capture of Antioch (270 CE) and the former Anatolian provinces controlled by her late husband (271 CE), she had coins struck in the mints of Antioch that portrayed Vaballathus as Augustus on one side and Aurelian as Augustus on the obverse (indicating co-equal status as colleague emperors). However, at the same time she also had coins struck that portrayed Vaballathus as Augustus and Zenobia as Augusta (i.e., emperor and empress) and coins that portrayed only Zenobia as Augusta, with Juno Regia on the obverse. It is also unknown exactly to what extent she and Vaballathus enjoyed support from the Roman populace and army in the eastern empire. During the reign of Odenathus, there had been ten legions in the region—III Cyrenaica in Bostra (Arabia Petraea), XVI Flavia Firma in Samosata (Cilicia), III Gallica (possibly in Antioch), X Fretensis in Jerusalem (Judaea), IV Scythica in Zeugma (Cappadocia), VI Ferrata at Caparcotna (Syria Coele), I Parthica in Nisibis (Roman Mesopotamia), III Parthica in Singara (Roman Mesopotamia), II Parthica in Apamea (Roman Mesopotamia), and XV Apollinarus in Satala (Armenia)—as well as roughly double that number of auxiliary units and border garrisons. We have evidence that at least some of these units served with Odenathus and formed a substantial portion of the Palmyrene army during his reign (further evidence that he may have been considered a legitimate co-emperor). However, several of these units had taken a mauling by the Persians under Shapur, many of the survivors would have been further depleted during the Macriani Revolt, and at least two legions are believed to have resisted Zenobia's takeover and to have been destroyed as a result (III Gallica and III Cyrenaica). Zenobia's rule was not popular in Palaestina, although whether this only represented perennial Hebrew resistance to outsiders or extended to the Roman administration is unknown (her general, Zabdas, had to suppress local revolts there, and is accused of having massacred Jews). Zenobia's takeover of the Anatolian provinces in 271 came at a time when Aurelian was already known to have been marching on Palmyra—he had been campaigning against the Goths and Sarmatians on the Danube frontier at the time of his accession (270 CE), had briefly returned to Rome to secure his position (early 271 CE), and then returned to the Balkans and mustered an army in Thrace (late 271 CE) in preparation for crossing over the Hellespont into Bithynia (early 272 CE). He is believed to have had six legions with him, and a roughly equal number of auxiliaries (a total of 60,000 men), although he seems to have faced little more than token resistance in Anatolia (with the sole exception of the city of Tyana in Cappadocia) and may have been joined by surviving elements of some of the above-cited eastern Roman units (by the time he reached Syria he may have had as many as 80,000 men). The fact that he did not face Palmyrene troops until he marched on Syria seems significant. He also sent a naval force (unknown strength) under the command of Marcus Aurelius Probus (the future emperor, ironically no relation to the Tenagino Probus discussed above) that successfully dislodged the Palmyrenes from Egypt. When Aurelian marched from Tyana in Cappadocia through Cilicia and into northern Syria, he was finally met in battle by the Palmyrene army outside Antioch, near the suburb of Immae. At the Battle of Immae (spring 272 CE) the Palmyrenes are believed to have fielded an army of 70-80,000 men (including Arab and Armenian allies). Both armies were drawn up in typical Roman fashion, with infantry in the center and cavalry on the wings, and Zabdas (the Palmyrene commander) seems to have taken up positions on the banks of the Orontes River to the north of the city. Aurelian had his cavalry engage the Palmyrene cavalry, which consisted mainly of heavily armored cataphracts, but ordered his own cavalry to make a feigned retreat to draw the Palmyrenes across the river and to continue to draw them in pursuit across the far plain until they and their mounts grew tired (it was hot, and the Palmyrene cavalrymen and horses were covered in heavy armor), at which point they were to return to the attack. The tactical device worked, and the Palmyrene cavalry were routed. The rest of the army had not been engaged, but with the threat of being able to be flanked with impunity, Zabdas made a retreat—a covering force of infantry occupied a hill on the outskirts of the Antiochene quarter of Daphne, while the remainder of the army retreated south to Emesa. The covering force was destroyed and Aurelian took Antioch, apparently with little or no resistance from the city garrison itself, which allowed him to pursue Zabdas to Emesa relatively quickly. This resulted in a second major battle—the Battle of Emesa—in which Aurelian apparently again tried the same tactic to draw the Palmyrene cavalry into a precipitous and tiring pursuit, although at Emesa this tactic came close to backfiring. The initial Roman cavalry attack, which was intended to draw out the Palmyrene cavalry, found itself instead completely overwhelmed by the shock of the Palmyrene counterattack, and the feigned retreat turned into a rout. However, the effect was much the same as the Palmyrene cavalry once again grew disorganized and weary pursuing the defeated Roman cavalry, and Aurelian threw units of “Palestinians [armed with] clubs and maces” (Zosimus) against them, leading to “great slaughter.” Zabdas apparently again managed to withdraw with most of his infantry, this time to Palmyra, where Zenobia had been busy overseeing the erection of a circuit of walls around the city and its oasis. Indeed, Aurelian still faced a formidable task as most of his troops were not accustomed to desert warfare, and at the rate of march of a Roman army Palmyra lay several days across the desert from Emesa. It is likely he may have traded in his pack mules and ox-carts for camels, it is believed that he formed a timely alliance with the nomadic Tanukh (discussed above) who served both as his guides and helped keep his army watered and supplied (the Tanukh later became Rome's primary allies in the region, and it is believed the origins of this relationship lay with Aurelian). Palmyra was invested in August 272 CE, at the height of the Syrian summer, and conditions were reputedly brutal on the besiegers. Nevertheless, after only a few days, Zenobia's Armenian allies defected to Aurelian (they had been camped nearby, and were probably supposed to harass Aurelian's supply lines, but may have suffered at the hands of Aurelian's Tanukh allies). Zenobia slipped out of the city in the middle of the night with a small escort and fled to the Euphrates, but Aurelian had been informed of her mission to seek aid from the Sassanids (he seems to have had spies in the city), and a force of Roman cavalry awaited her. She was captured, displayed to the Palmyrene defenders on the following day, and the city surrendered. The city was looted, although there seems to have been several groups within the city (significantly including the priests of the temple of Bel) that had remained loyal to Rome, and their properties were spared (again, one has the impression Zenobia had never fully seceded from Rome and may not have enjoyed widespread support). The wall was torn down, most of the populace was given the opportunity to again swear allegiance to Rome, and a relative of Zenobia named Antiochus (his exact relationship to her is unknown) was made ras, while a Roman governor and 600 bowmen were left as a garrison.

 

Aurelian had Zenobia, Vaballathus, Zabdas, and the members of her court taken to Emesa and tried for treason (maiestas). This is also probably significant, since a foreign sovereign would not have been tried for treason. All were convicted—Zenobia was spared, but the rest of her court were executed. We do not know what happened to Vaballathus because he disappears from the historical record at this time, which may indicate he was executed, although some sources claim he died of natural causes later, and others that he and his mother survived much longer. We know that Zenobia was forced to accompany Aurelian as he marched back to Thrace, and that she was still in his train when he was forced to make an about-face and march back to Palmyra in late 272 CE, after Antiochus revolted, killed Aurelian's garrison, and had himself declared emperor of the east (he was supported by a revolt in Egypt under a wealthy merchant named Firmus). Aurelian stormed Palmyra a second time, Antiochus was killed in battle, and the city was subjected to slaughter and widespread destruction. Although a much-reduced populace remained, Aurelian had the official status of Palmyra as a Roman colony revoked, and its status as Rome's primary Syrian trade entrepôt was transferred north to Nisibis (Upper Mesopotamia). Aurelian then crushed Firmus' revolt in Egypt, and he and Zenobia did not arrive back in Rome until late in 273 CE. Zenobia was still his prisoner when he crossed the Alps into Gaul and defeated Gaius Pius Esuvius Tetricus (271-274 CE), last emperor of the Gallic Empire, at the Battle of Châlons (274). Both Zenobia and Tetricus were subsequently paraded in Rome at Aurelian's Triumph with the spoils of his campaigns in the east (Zenobia was paraded in golden chains), after which he assumed the title Restitutor Orbis (Latin, “Restorer of the World”) and began to style himself as dominus et deus (“master and god”) in his correspondence. It was normal practice to have foreign rulers ritually strangled (with a garrote) by a public executioner when the Triumphal parade reached the temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline, although there were notable instances in which clemency was given and, as we have seen, there is some reason to believe Zenobia was still considered a Roman citizen. However, Roman traitors were usually taken to the top of the Tarpeian Rock (an escarpment that formed the southern summit of the Capitoline Hill) and thrown to their death on the rocks below, but once again, clemency was possible. We know for certain that Tetricus was spared—he was given a minor posting as corrector (a financial office) in the bucolic region of Lucania (southern Italy)—and some sources state that Zenobia (and possibly even Vaballathus) were allowed to retire to a villa in Tivoli (19 miles NE of Rome). We simply do not know. Aurelian was subsequently assassinated while preparing to invade the Sassanid Persian Empire (September 275 CE), but his policies were taken up by many of his successors, leading to the transformation of the Late Roman Principate to the Roman Dominate.