MILITARY SYSTEMS OF PRE-ISLAMIC ARABIA

I have herein divided the military system of the later pre-Islamic Arabian peoples into three categories—the Nomads, the Agro-Pastoralist States, and the Agricultural States. The Nomads were the independent tribes (ashira) or pan-tribal federations (asabiyah) that traversed the desolate regions of desert and steppe throughout the Arabian Peninsula, engaged primarily in herding dromedaries, raiding settled peoples and each other, and serving as mercenaries in the armies of their neighbors. The Agro-Pastoralist States were the kingdoms (malakut) or city-states (hadir) centered on an oasis or several oases that included both an urban population of traders, farmers, and sedentary pastoralists living in fixed settlements near the oases, usually with a ruling tribe or federation of tribes that maintained strong ties of kinship or alliance with nearby nomadic groups. The Agricultural States were those established along the eastern coastal regions of Arabia—Gerrha and Maketa—in what is today Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Oman, and the those in southern Arabia—Saba, Ma'in, Qataban, Hadramawt, and Himyar—in what is today Yemen. Due to these regions being much wetter than the rest of the Arabian Peninsula, the states that arose there were fully agrarian, although they were also engaged in large-scale maritime and/or overland trade. Culturally, these states were also different from those in the rest of the peninsula—Gerrha and Maketa had a heavy Syro-Mesopotamian element, as well as strong Persian influences (and eventually Persian dominion), while the southern states of Yemen had longstanding cultural and economic ties with the Kushitic peoples of East Africa, and also strong Persian influence (and eventually Persian dominion).

 

Strategically, most of the peoples of the pre-Islamic Arabian Peninsula were concerned with, at best, regional hegemony and tribal security. The importance of trade to the more-settled, more-urban, and agrarian civilizations of the oases and coasts meant that these societies tended to lead the way when it came to the creation (or attempt to create) pan-tribal political federations (asabiyah), kingdoms (malakut), or city-states (hadir) that could prevent major disruptions of trade networks. The great southern and eastern agricultural kingdoms had far-reaching strategic interests aimed both at securing a dominant position in trade with Persia, the Hellenistic states of Syria and Palestine, the Kushitic peoples of East Africa, the Indo-Aryans of India, and the Roman Empire. They also had the most socially stratified societies, including bureaucratic administrators and professional soldiers, and it is in the southern kingdoms in particular that we most-often see large-scale warfare—campaigns of conquest and/or to secure resources or trade routes. Set against this was the tendency of the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes to carry out gazawan (Arabic, “raiding,” often transliterated in French and English as razzia)—against each other, the settled peoples, and the trade caravans—especially in times of shortage and need (a perpetual possibility in an often harsh and unforgiving topographical landscape). The importance of kin-based social systems and codes of honor (muruwwa) practiced by many of the peoples of the pre-Islamic Arabian Peninsula also meant that these raids, social offenses committed by even one member of one lineage against another, or the breaking of a cultic taboo or religious prohibition could lead to serious, sometimes decades-long, feuds and inter-tribal warfare. Nevertheless, most nomadic and semi-nomadic groups recognized the importance of regional trade as a potential source of greater material security, and throughout this period there was a tendency amongst the nomadic and semi-nomadic groups to form into coalitions or federations of tribes that could secure access to the wealth that flowed back and forth across their land by providing safe passage to caravans and traders in return for tribute, by developing close kinship ties with the oasis/agrarian/urban folk and thereby actively participating in the socio-economic activities of these communities, or by setting themselves up as political powers in their own right that could treat with foreign states directly. Federations were often based on extended kin groups identified by adding banu, bani, or beni (literally, "children of," but meaning "descended from") to the nomenclature identifying a federation, which recognized the distant kinship of the associated tribes (ashira) and clans (al) to a common progenitor, thus stressing the importance of kinship as a basis for alliance (sometimes these ties of kinship were rather artfully contrived in order to legitimate political expediency). The progenitor was usually a powerful and/or righteous chief (sayyid/sheikh/shaykh)—as I said in my discussion of the origins of the Arab tribes on the Gallery page, these genealogies and the progenitors of the line were sometimes mythical in nature.

 

Added to the strategic dimensions of pre-Islamic Arabian society was the intervention of foreign powers in the region, including the occasional shift of trade routes to follow different paths, often in response to geopolitical shifts outside the Arabian Peninsula. In particular, improvements in ship technology and growing knowledge of the geography of the Arabian Peninsula and the surrounding bodies of water acquired by Hellenistic Syrian and Romanized Mediterranean traders led to the development of long-distance shipping that had, by the first century CE, eclipsed the importance of the overland caravans, leading to decreased prosperity for those states that had developed to dominate these routes (e.g., Nabataea, Lihyan, Saba, Ma'in, Hadramawt). Additionally, the long struggle for supremacy in Syria-Mesopotamia fought between the Roman Empire and the Arsakid and Sassanid dynasties of Persia (ca. 92 BCE-629 CE) led to the eventual demise of the Hellenistic Syrian states as both empires tried to secure more-direct control of their respective frontier regions. As the borders were pushed further out into the deserts both empires sought to foster the development of larger and more centralized Arab polities amongst the nomadic tribes of the northern and eastern peninsula (e.g., the Tanukhids, Salihids, Ghassanids, and Lakhmids) through monetary subsidies, religious proselytization, and mutual military aid. The Himyarites of southern Arabia made a similar play for power in central Arabia via their support of the Kindite Kingdom. Finally, various Mesopotamian (Kassite, Babylonian, Assyrian), Macedonian (Alexander and the Seleukids), Greco-Aramaic (Charakene), and Persian (Arsakid and Sassanid) states had long had an interest in extending their political and economic hegemony into Bahrayn-Magan, thus staking a claim to trade passing through the Persian Gulf from India and East Africa, and this often led to the foundation of foreign colonies in Bahrayn-Magan, the occasional extension of dominion over swathes of the coast and islands, and the eventual conquest of the entire region by the Sassanid Persians (ca. third to seventh centuries CE). This last development overlay an imperial political apparatus that subordinated local polities and transformed their strategic outlook. This became particularly significant when the Byzantines sought to extend their hegemony into Qahtan by supporting an invasion (ca. 528 CE) of the Himyarite Kingdom by the Byzantines' Axumite allies from East Africa (modern Eritrea and Ethiopia). The invasion was ostensibly to prevent the Himyarite king, who was Jewish, from continuing to persecute (and massacre) Christians in his kingdom, although there were definitely economic factors at stake (the conquest of Qahtan would give the Byzantine-Axumite alliance complete control over Red Sea trade, allowing the Byzantines to bypass the Persians when it came to trade with India). However, the resulting Axumite-Persian War (558-578 CE) led to the conquest of Qahtan/Yaman by the Sassanids (Yaman replaced Qahtan as the name of all southern Arabia during this period), which they held until the coming of Islam (ca. 628 CE). As with Bahrayn-Magan, the Persians again overlaid their own imperial bureaucracy on local institutions, but in both locales Persian administrative control seems to have been slight (the Persians subsidized local rulers favorable to their economic interests, and their governors and small garrisons in these regions were themselves "Arabized").

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Most of the nomads (badawi) used camels for transportation (and food), although during the pre-Islamic period they usually dismounted to fight as infantry, although most had a small number of bow-armed camel-mounted skirmishers. They could and did sometimes fight from camels, but usually only when the terrain demanded it (camels could operate in sand-dune terrain that was difficult for infantry and cavalry). Tribal chiefs and their retinues generally rode camels for transportation to and from a battlefield, making travel easier for their horses, and then transferred themselves to their horse mounts for battle. The retinues of most tribal chiefs would not have been extensive—mostly close kin and a few companions—and they would have fought in a skirmishing style (karr-wa-farr, "attack-and-retreat") with thrown spears, using swords and/or axes only when a tactical advantage had been achieved or when closely pressed by an opponent. The bulk of tribal warriors fighting afoot tended to prefer shock infantry tactics (impetuous charges aimed at sweeping away enemy resistance), although they would not have had dense formations, and if they faced determined resistance they were quick to melt away into the desert. Weapons would have been the same as those wielded by the retinues, although long fighting knives probably replaced swords in the hands of many commoners. There were also sometimes a small minority of warriors that preferred to fight with bow or sling as infantry skirmishers. The agro-pastoralist federations (e.g., the Banu Kindah, Banu Tayy, and Banu Ghatafan), kingdoms (e.g., the Tanukhids, Salihids, Ghassanids, and Lakhmids), and city-states  (e.g., Yathrib/Medina, Makkah/Mecca, Hegra, and Ta'if) generally had a similar military system, although their greater wealth and larger population, usually including settled oasis and/or city dwellers, meant that their armies were usually larger, better equipped, and included some tactical formations that were different from those of the nomads. In particular, chiefs and kings and their retinues often fought in larger, denser mounted formations; they often wore body armor (mostly mail) and helmets; and they eschewed traditional karr-wa-farr tactics for an emphasis on shock tactics (Greek, Roman/Byzantine, and Persian authors often referred to them as lancers). Most of these federations, kingdoms, and city-states could raise a militia of oasis-dwellers and/or citizens, generally divided between infantry spearmen and bowmen. Unlike nomad infantry, the agro-pastoralist spearmen tended to emphasize denser formations and more conservative tactics. They were usually unarmored, although they carried swords and axes as sidearms and carried shields. Bowmen also generally used denser formations and concentrated on mass area-affect volleys, although some bowmen fought as infantry skirmishers. As with the nomads, some of the infantry skirmishers were armed with slings. In the northern frontier regions between Rome/Byzantium and Persia, there also developed a class of mercenaries that served as caravan guards and/or outpost/oasis garrisons—normally, they protected the economic interests of their employers, but they were also used in raiding and warfare. They were generally armored in mail, wielded a combination of spears and swords, and carried cane shields wrapped in bands of leather. As with the nomads, the agro-pastoralists used camels for transportation, then dismounted or switched to horses for battle. Most of these states had close ties—social and economic—with various nomad groups who provided auxiliaries. Horses were introduced to eastern and southern Arabia about two hundred years after they were introduced to rest of Arabia, which perhaps explains some of the different tactics employed by the noble retinues of the south. Camels were still used for overland transportation, and the commoners still usually dismounted to fight as infantry, but for unknown reasons the nobles of the agricultural kingdoms often preferred to fight from camelback when campaigning in the lowlands, and generally only fought as infantry when campaigning in the highlands. After about 200 BCE, cavalry did grow in importance (similar to the cavalry of the agro-pastoralist states), but camelry remained important until the Sassanid conquest of the east (ca. 200 CE) and south (ca. 570 CE). Militias of commoners were, as with the northern agro-pastoralist states, generally split between spearmen and bowmen, with a minority of bow and/or sling armed skirmishers, although the spearmen of the south seem to have preferred sustained ranged combat with thrown spears/javelins before initiating close combat. This was likely due to the different topography of southern and eastern Arabia, as well as the influence of the Kushitic peoples.

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The primary weapons of all pre-Islamic Arab armies were the spear, sword, long fighting knife, javelins/darts, bow and arrows, sling and sling-stones, and axe, in descending order of importance. The most important metalworking centers were in Bahrayn-Magan and Qahtan/Yaman, although there were also centers of production in some of the major oasis city-states of the north and west, and there were itinerant clans of tinkers that specialized in the small-scale production and repair of metal implements and weapons (the nomads often held these tinkers in contempt, but there is no doubt that they found their services useful). Armor production (mostly mail and hardened leather) was also centered in Bahrayn-Magan and Qahtan/Yaman. This was due to the fact that most of the major ore deposits in the Arabian Peninsula lay in the highlands of the Oman Peninsula (the Hajar Mountains) and the mountains of southern Arabia (the Hadramawt and Haraz mountains), although it was also due to the import of high-quality ingots from abroad (especially Indian wootz steel and bamboo for the shafts of lances/spears and javelins/darts). Mail (and later, lamellar) was also imported from Persia, Rome, and India, as were swords. Arrow-shafts were usually of reed, which meant arrow production was also greatest in the south and east where there were wetlands, although in the north Mesopotamian, Syrian, Judaean, and Egyptian reed could be had. The most popular type of shield used throughout the peninsula was a round leather shield over a wicker frame, although in Bahrayn-Magan and Qahtan/Yaman hexagonal shields (likely wood, with a leather covering, bound around the edges and embossed in the center with bronze or iron, and sometimes with a central ridge of metal or wood) are sometimes pictured in period art. These look like variations of the Greek thureos or an undersized Roman scutum, which should not be totally surprising—Hellenistic influence was felt, mainly in Bahrayn-Magan and Qahtan, from the time of the naval expeditions of Alexander's admiral (navarch), Nearchos (360-300 BCE), to explore the eastern Arabian Sea coast and the Persian Gulf (ca. 326-324 BCE), although this influence likely grew due to the commercial exploits of later Hellenistic Syrian traders, particularly those of Charakene/Mesene (ca. 127 BCE-222 CE), Nabataea (200 BCE-106 CE), and Palmyra (312 BCE-273 CE). The Romans established a presence in Qahtan as early as the first century BCE, with the disastrous expedition (ca. 26-24 BCE) of the prefect of Egypt, Gaius Aelius Gallus, who was acting on the orders of emperor Octavius Augustus. Although this initial Roman military probe into Arabia was repulsed, later Roman traders were more successful, and in subsequent centuries the Romans under emperor Trajan managed to push their hegemony into the Hejaz as far south as the oasis-city of Hegra (ca. 113-117 CE). From then until the rise of Islam the Romans and their Byzantine successors continued to expand their political and commercial interests in the region of the Red Sea and southern Arabia, ultimately leading to the Axumite-Persian Wars (ca. 528-570 CE). Certainly, in addition to locally made weapons and armor, the pre-Islamic Arabians also imported martial equipment. In addition to raw materials from India, Indian mail, scale, and swords were popular in Bahrayn-Magan and Qahtan/Yaman; Persian mail, helmets, and swords were popular in the eastern and central regions of the peninsula, as well as along the Mesopotamian frontier; and the Hellenistic Syrians and Romans mainly exported mail, helmets, swords, and composite bows to northern Arabia and Qahtan. Metal helmets and axes seem to have been rare commodities, used only by kings (malik, melik, melekh, malka, or mukarrib), chiefs (sayyid, sheikh, or shayk), nobles (sharif) and their retinues (especially amongst the heavy cavalry). Everyone else was either bareheaded, wore some form of head covering (turban, scarf, or cap, with only the turban providing a small degree of protection), or wore hardened leather helmets (sometimes with metal or horn plaques sewn on).

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The northern Arab peoples would also have had access to Hellenistic Syrians as allies (e.g., Nabataea, Palmyra, Hatra, Charakene) until about 324 CE, Greco-Macedonian colonists (ca. 322-63 BCE), and eventually Roman/Byzantine border garrisons (ca. 63 BCE-712 CE). Each of these groups were known to carry out military operations beyond the official borders in support of friendly Arab tribes—not just large-scale alliances, but small operations with limited strategic goals (e.g., helping a friendly tribe wipe out a not-so-friendly tribe). These mercenary/allied units would provide additional tactical dimensions to the forces of their Arab allies. This meant heavy cavalry cataphracts, horse archers, and infantry bowmen from the Syrians; heavy cavalry (klibanophoroi) and infantry (thureophoroi/thyreophoroi/thorakitai) from the Greco-Macedonian colonists; and Roman border garrison cavalry (equites) and infantry (auxilia). The Lakhmids of southern Mesopotamia similarly counted on the support of the Sassanid Persians—from about 325 CE, there was a Persian garrison stationed at the Lakhmid capital at Hira that consisted of several units of Persian heavy cavalry (aspabaran) and infantry bowmen (kamanderan). Persian military support of the marzubanates (i.e., military border provinces) in Bahrayn/Meshan (ca. 325-637 CE), Magan/Mazun (ca. 222-628 CE), and Qahtan/Yaman (ca. 570-628 CE) was similar to that provided to the Lakhmids—a small garrison of heavy cavalry and infantry bowmen that supported the governor, as well as a small number of Persian land-owners/colonists, that basically only supplemented the native warriors of local rulers. Finally, the polities of southern Arabia, the Plain of Tihama, and the Hijaz also had access to Kushitic Aksumite and Abyssinian mercenaries and allies. The southern Arabian Kingdom of Saba established trade colonies in the Kingdom of D'mt (980-400 BCE) as early as 700 BCE, but the East African presence in southern Arabia and Tihama was greatly accelerated during the period of Axumite dominance in East Africa (ca. 100-980 CE), especially after the Axumites established a large colony at Najran on the Plain of Tihama (ca. 400 CE) and, after this colony had been massacred by an Himyarite king, the Axumite invasion and occupation of Himyar (528-570 CE). Initially (ca. 700 BCE-100 CE), these East African mercenaries (ahabish) seem to have been primarily light infantry javelinmen (small round shield, no armor, spear and javelins/darts with a short sword sidearm). Later Axumite mercenaries tended to be cavalry, heavy infantry, medium infantry, light infantry, and/or infantry bowmen (the increase in different types of mercenaries is due to the fact that many Axumites chose to settle in southern Arabia in the period leading up to the Axumite invasion and after). Early Axumite warriors were generally unarmored or lightly armored with padded leather jackets (qnat or meqennet)(ca. 100-970 CE). Mail (tsrur or dir'a hatsin) and helmets (qur) were generally used only by the wealthiest nobles (mail was not locally produced, but imported from Rome). After 970 CE, mail became both heavier and more prevalent in the cavalry and heavy infantry arms (as did helmets), both groups being dominated by nobles and their retinues. Cavalrymen generally carried a large round hide shield (welatw), a collection of light spears (quiyanw)—mainly for throwing—and one of several types of swords (asyft). The most distinctive sword of the Axumites and Abyssinians was the shotel, a sickle-like sword with an almost semicircular blade that could be used single- or two-handed, but they also had short straight-bladed and long straight-bladed swords. The main infantry arm, and the units most often found as mercenaries in Arabia, were essentially unarmored medium infantry skirmishers that carried either a large round hide shield or a smaller buckler-like version, and wielded spears, darts, and swords. Marines tended to be the best armed and trained, since they were generally not levies but more-or-less full-time mercenaries (similar to caravan guards). These could be organized as flexible main-battle infantry or as skirmishers. Similarly, unarmored infantry bowmen could be recruited, and could be mass archers or skirmishers. After the Axumites established their colony at Najran, and certainly after the Axumite invasion (many of the Axumite soldiers chose to settle down as colonists), heavy infantry would have joined the ranks of possible mercenaries. After about 970, at least a portion of each such unit would have been armored in mail or hardened leather (as well as the traditional padded jackets), and they would have added the axe and mace to their repertoire of weaponry, including the fearsome two-handed mace (up to 3 feet long) called a dembus or lutat. Most heavy infantry would have carried shields, but obviously the two-handed macemen probably wore heavier armor and left the shield at home. The Axumite viceroy of Yaman, Abraha al-Ashram (531-570 CE), used war elephants against the city-state of Makkah/Mecca in 570 CE, so it is likely that at least one of the two Axumite invasion armies that landed in southern Arabia (in 528 and 547 CE) brought war-elephants, although they all seem to have been killed along with Abraha at the siege of Makkah (subsequently in Islamic tradition, 570 CE was known as "the Year of the Elephant"), so at the most generous we can say elephants may have been featured in southern Arabian warfare from 528-570 CE.