HISTORY OF PRE-ISLAMIC ARABIA

 

The history of pre-Islamic Arabian civilization is usually divided into three periods—Bronze Age Arabia (3200 - 1300 BCE), Iron Age Arabia (1300 - 400 BCE), and Pre-Islamic Arabia (400 BCE - 969 CE). The Arabian Peninsula experienced a substantial Late Neolithic "wet period" between 8000 and 4000 BCE, at which time the peninsula had a much more diverse biome, with a wide range of flora and fauna, although from 4000 BCE to the present the peninsula has undergone substantial aridization (i.e., expansion of deserts), with consequent die-offs of many species. However, even during the early archeological and historical periods outlined above, there remained substantial oasis, steppe, and highland zones to which some species retreated before dying off or being hunted to extinction by the end of the Pre-Islamic Period (e.g., lions, cheetahs, ostriches, water buffalos, and hippos), while others adapted to the increasingly arid conditions and survived into modern times (e.g., camels, gazelles, wild asses, wild goats, wolves, foxes, caracals, leopards, hyenas, jackals, and baboons). But I think it important to note that the topography, flora and fauna, and climate of ancient Arabia was significantly more moderate and more diverse than today, with much more substantial natural arable zones.  

 

NORTHERN ARABIA

The first use of the term "Arab" (Assyrian, arbâi) dates to 737 BCE on a stele erected by Tiglath-Pilesar III (745-727 BCE), king of Assyria, upon his conquest of the land of Aram (modern-day Syria). At that time, the dominant proto-Arab tribal coalition in the northern Arabian Peninsula was that of the Kingdom of Qedar/Kedar (approx. 800-410 BCE), based on the oasis-settlements of Dedan, Tayma, and Dumah (the kingdom is believed to have encompassed a broad arc of territory from the southern Hijazi Plain across the Sarawat Mountains and the Nafud Desert to the steppes south of the Euphrates). To the west of the Qedarites were several Semitic peoples that were part of the same Central Semitic ethno-linguistic group as the Qedarites—in Aram/Syria and southern Mesopotamia there was a string of Aramaean states (i.e., the Biblical Amorites), the Auranitis/Hauran Desert region of northwestern Jordan was home to the Ammonites, to the south of the Ammonites in the northern half of the Jordan Rift Valley were the Moabites, the southern half of the Jordan Rift Valley was home to the Edomites, and the northern half of the Hijaz, as well as the Sinai and Negev deserts, was home to the Midianites. The Qedarites fought alongside the Aramaeans, Ammonites, Moabites, and Edomites to resist the expansion of the Assyrian Empire—the effort failed, and the Levant and its peoples were incorporated into the Assyrian Empire (although the Qedarite capital at Dedan, and its Hijazi territories, remained unconquered). The Assyrians attempted to create a stable frontier system in northern Arabia by creating a network of client kings across southern Mesopotamia, Aram/Syria, and Jordan who could manage and maintain the growing overland trade networks that linked Egypt (via the Sinai), East Africa (via the Red Sea), eastern Arabia (via southern Mesopotamia), and southern Arabia (via Tihama and the Hijaz). This pattern would become the norm in northern Arabia in the coming centuries as various Israelite, Syrian, Persian, Greco-Macedonian, and Greco-Roman powers sought to extend their dominions into, or expand their dominions within, northern Arabia, mostly to protect commercial interests, but also to prevent the nomads of these regions from raiding the settled agrarian lands to the north and west. Those Arab tribes that lived closest to the frontiers, or who migrated there, became embroiled in frontier politics, and from about 800 BCE to 800 CE there were several waves of migration from central, eastern, western, and southern Arabia into the Levant and Mesopotamia, which ultimately led to the development of more-complex socio-cultural aggregates.

 

The first wave of proto-Arab groups that migrated into the Levant assimilated with the Aramaeans/Amorites (resulting in the Syrian culture), the Edomites (resulting in the Idumaean culture), the Moabites and Ammonites (resulting in the Nabataean culture), and the Midianites (resulting in the Thamudic culture). The Qedarite Kingdom disappeared around 410 BCE, to be replaced by the Lihyanite Kingdom (see below), and with the collapse of the Lihyanite Kingdom around 106 CE (and the annexation of Nabataea by Rome soon after, ca. 117 CE) we begin to see the emergence of a number of individually identifiable nomadic or semi-nomadic tribal groups that spoke what is today called Old Arabic (derived from Central Semitic antecedents), and also around this time (ca. 400 BCE-106/117 CE) we see the beginning of the processes of ethnogenesis that would lead to the adoption of the Arabic language throughout the Arabian Peninsula, as well as the adoption of broad cultural norms that would unite the Arabian peoples under the umbrella of Islam (although, as always, I would like to emphasize that under this umbrella are a number of distinct sub-groups). Coinciding with this cultural-linguistic shift, from Bronze and Iron Age northern Arabia to Pre-Islamic Arabia, we also see the introduction of cavalry warfare (ca. 400-200 BCE), which had a profound impact on the military systems discussed herein.

 

To the Greeks and Romans, the Hellenized Arabo-Central Semitic peoples were Syrians—during the Bronze and Iron Ages, the Central Semitic peoples became closely linked to the Assyrians, and the word "Syrian" is based on the ancient Greek transliteration of "Assyrian" (see my Hellenistic Syrians gallery). Syria stretched north of the Yarmouk/Yarmuk River and the Sea of Galilee to the Taurus Mountains, but did not include the Mediterranean littoral (that was Judaea and Phoenicia), and it ran east from the Bekaa Valley and the Orontes River to Upper Mesopotamia (it was recognized that there were pockets of Syrians in other parts of Mesopotamia as well). To the south and east of Syria were two regions—Arabia Petraea/Petrea (Latin, "Rocky Arabia") and Arabia Deserta/Arabia Magna ("Abandoned Arabia/Greater Arabia"). Arabia Petraea corresponded to the Auranitis and Idumaea (the Harran Desert region, corresponding to ancient Edom) and Nabataea (the Jordan Rift Valley, the Negev Desert, the Sinai Desert, and the Hijaz, corresponding to ancient Moab and Midian). Arabia Deserta/Magna Arabia included the vast desert and steppe regions of the northern and central Arabian Peninsula, corresponding to the Hisma, Nafud, Dahna, and Great Arabian deserts, the Najd Plateau, and the steppes of Yamamah. The nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples of the Auranitis, Negev, Sinai, and Syrian deserts, the Hijazi and Tihama plains, and Greater Arabia were known collectively as Sarakene/Saraceni (Greek/Latin, "Tent People"), and their land was considered "abandoned" by civilized peoples—an inconveniently placed wasteland that needed to be crossed or bypassed (by sea) to reach Arabia Felix/Eudaimon Arabia (Latin/Greek, "Fortunate (or Happy) Arabia"), home of several populous and prosperous agrarian kingdoms with covetable material goods to trade (mostly spices and aromatics) and a civilized population (both by virtue of living in cities and in fixed structures). However, it is with the ancient northern and central Arabian peoples that we see the emergence of the Arabic language, and to whom modern ethnologists attribute the development of the core features of Semitic Arab identity.  

 

The Lihyanite Kingdom (410 BCE-106 CE)

As mentioned, the Qedarite Kingdom had been the primary socio-political entity in northern Arabia during the Bronze and Iron Ages. Its capital had been at the oasis of Dedan, on the southern Hijazi Plain, although it also had centers at the oases of Tayma (also on the Hijazi Plain) and Dumah (an oasis region in the Nafud Desert). Qedarite influence was felt throughout northern Arabia, but the exact contours of the state are unknown—there are several distinct archeological and linguistic groups that have been identified in northern Arabia during the Bronze Age, but their exact relationship to each other is unknown. Although the Assyrians had campaigned against the Qedarites and declared Qedar part of their empire, Qedar had remained largely unconquered—the Qedarites only vaguely recognized their status as vassals of Assyria (and of Assyria's Neo-Babylonian successors), and later formed an alliance with the Achaemenid Persians when they toppled the Neo-Babylonian Empire (ca. 539-514 BCE). Thereafter, their history is obscure. By the beginning of the fifth century BCE, period sources refer to another northern Arab polity that was centered on the oases of Dedan, Tayma, and Dumah, and also seemingly having wide influence amongst the tribes of northern Arabia. This was the Lihyanite Kingdom (410 BCE-106 CE). Once again, the exact borders of this state are unknown, although it seems to have roughly corresponded to the territory of the Qedarites. Whether this marked the takeover of the Qedarite Kingdom by another group of Arabs, a dynastic change, or simply a name change for the same group is unknown. Archeologically and linguistically, both kingdoms are part of what is today called the Dedanite cultural-linguistic group, which makes me tend toward the interpretation that the Lihyanites were the second and last dynasty of a political entity that should be called the Dedanite Kingdom (800 BCE-106 CE)—thus, we would have the Qedarite Dynasty (800-410 BCE) and the Lihyanite Dynasty (410 BCE-106 CE). The Dedanites themselves have, unfortunately, left little evidence for the composition of their state or its history, despite some impressive archeological sites (like the Nabataeans, they carved monuments, tombs, temples, storehouses, cisterns, and other structures into cliff-sides and mesas), and contemporary Mediterranean and Levantine sources (i.e., Greeks and Israelites) seem to confuse the terms Qedarite and Lihyanite, sometimes attributing the same facts to both groups (and they are sometimes lumped together in Biblical and Quranic historiography as "Ishmaelites"). To my mind, this strengthens the argument that we may be dealing with two ruling parties of the same socio-political entity. Regardless, this "state" seems to have been a kind of federation of nomadic tribes and oasis-dwellers, and it is extremely doubtful that the Dedanite/Qedarite/Lihyanite kings enjoyed any kind of direct administrative control over the peoples of their kingdom. Indeed, in addition to the Lihyanites, the Nabatu are believed to have emerged from the collapse of Qedar as a distinct group, and to have migrated into Moab and Ammon (ca. 500-400 BCE), where they founded the Nabataean Kingdom (400 BCE-106 CE). The Lihyanites had their capital at Dumah (the capital of Qedar had been at Dedan), and the Lihyanites became inveterate foes of the Nabataeans—both peoples competed fiercely over the caravan trade that came up the western coast of Arabia to the Mediterranean. Unfortunately, we know as little about this kingdom as we do about the Qedarites, other than its archeological and linguistic continuity with Qedar, and the fact that they are often mentioned in terse accounts of battles with the Nabataeans. When Rome annexed the Nabataean Kingdom (ca. 106 CE), however, the Roman emperor Trajan (98-117 CE) also moved to annex the Hijaz as far south as the oasis of Hegra (modern Mada'in Saleh, located in-between Dedan and Tayma). Those groups in the Hijaz that had been living under the suzerainty of Nabataea (northern Hijaz) or Lihyan (southern Hijaz) were made federates of Rome. Whatever central authority had been exercised by the kings of Lihyan seems to have evaporated, and the kingdom is believed to have dissolved at this time (although the Banu Lihyan remained in the southern Hijaz until the coming of Islam)—the Romans had taken the Lihyanites' most lucrative trade routes and caravanserai in the Hijaz, and those had already been weakened by the shift from caravan to seaborne trade (ca. 200 BCE-100 CE). We know that Trajan made diplomatic overtures to many of the nomadic groups in northern Arabia (presumably, those that had once been a part of the Lihyanite hegemony), and Trajan seems to have been interested in establishing a string of federate groups between the Hijaz and southern Mesopotamia, where Trajan also initiated a war against the Parthians and temporarily conquered much of Mesopotamia (ca. 115-117 CE). Unfortunately, we do not know what Trajan's ultimate plans may have been because he died before being able to consolidate Rome's hold on Mesopotamia (ca. 117 CE), his successor Hadrian (117-138 CE) abandoned Mesopotamia, and Trajan's written account of his campaigns (it was apparently an autobiography) was later lost to history. His actions and those of Hadrian, however, transformed the geopolitical status quo in northern Arabia, and henceforth the Roman Empire exerted enormous socio-cultural, economic, and political-military influences on the northern Arabian peoples—the Arabian frontier of Rome (Latin, Limes Arabicus) was formally established along an axis that ran from the Gulf of Aqaba in the south to the Euphrates River in the north, but Rome's Arabian frontier developed into a complex tapestry of Arab groups with varying relationships to the empire, and the frontier developed into a wide zone that straddled both sides of the official border.

 

The Roman Border, the Federate Frontier, and the Arab Shield 

Initially, Rome inherited the frontier system that had characterized northern Arabia during the Achaemenid, Seleukid, and Arsakid/Parthian periods in the region, which is to say that the primary states were those of the Hellenized Arabo-Central Semitic Syrians, while the tribes of the deep desert and steppe regions were loosely federated under the leadership of Lihyan. There are a plethora of tribal names, usually identified only through inscriptions left by notables of these tribes, which gives us something of a sense of the complexity of the north Arabian frontier during the Hellenistic and early Roman periods (ca. 400 BCE-200 CE). Many of these tribes had close socio-political ties to the Syrians, but the Greeks and Romans tended to lump them together under the rubric of "Saracens," which makes their presence in historical accounts somewhat nebulous (the northern Arabians themselves left inscriptions, but no histories). The clouds only really begin to clear with the domino-like collapse of the various Syrian states (ca. 200-300 CE) as Rome and Sassanid Persia destroyed and/or annexed the various Hellenistic Syrian states and were, perforce, required to deal with the tribes of northern Arabia directly in order to attempt to impose their sense of order on the frontier. The Roman Empire and the Sassanid Persian Empire fought a long series of what were essentially proxy wars in northern and central Arabia between the fourth and early seventh centuries CE, as an adjunct to the direct conflicts between these two empires for control of Upper Mesopotamia and Syria. To this end, each empire subsidized the development of large Arab tribal kingdoms along their borders by supporting various royal dynasties that were recognized as imperial clients. As such, they were expected to act as buffer-states, protecting the citizens of the frontier regions from the raids of Arab tribes from the interior of the Arabian Peninsula, policing the trade caravans, and providing troops for imperial campaigns.

 

The Romans maintained a series of federated Arab states (Latin, foederati) along its Arabian frontier—the Banu Balqayn were settled in the Sinai and Negev deserts; the Banu Bali, Banu Judham, and Banu Udhrah were settled in the northern half of the Hijaz (on lands formerly belonging to the Thamud); the Banu Lihyan and Banu Juhaynah were settled in the southern Hijaz; the Banu Salih and Banu Amila were settled in the Hisma Desert region (formerly the eastern frontier of Nabataea); and the Banu Tanukh were settled in the western Syrian Desert region (formerly the heartlands of Palmyra). Some elements of the Banu Kalb were also settled in Syria, mainly in the Samawah Desert, and these seem to have also been federates of Rome, although as I will discuss below the Banu Kalb was a huge federation of tribes with some groups that lived entirely outside the empire. The Romans seem to have developed a three-tiered frontier system, the exact contours of which are much-debated because the evidence is sometimes confusing and flies in the face of modern concepts of a border. As I see it, the three tiers are best defined in relation to the Roman terms for borders (Latin, limes), federates (Latin, foederati), and friends and allies (Latin, amici et socii), although I conceptualize these terms in relation to Rome's Arabian frontier as representing the Roman Border, the Federate Frontier, and the Arab Shield (a term I borrowed from the eminent scholar of pre-Islamic northern Arabia, Irfan Shahid). To put it simply, the Roman Border in northern Arabia (the Limes Arabicus) was established along a curving line (as seen on a map) that ran from the Gulf of Aqaba in the south for about 930 miles to the northeast to the city of Circesium on the Euphrates River. As in other border regions of the empire, this border was dotted by a series of forts (Latin, castra), each approximately 60 miles apart, with outposts (Latin, castellum) in-between, all linked by a network of roads, which also linked the border to the major cities to the west. The border largely followed the line of an ancient road, known to the Romans as the Via Regia (Latin, "King's Road"), which had developed in the Iron Age to link Moab, Edom, Ammon, and Aram with the Hijaz and the Red Sea, and this road had later been expanded and maintained by the Nabataeans and Palmyrenes. Trajan had the road further improved and re-named it the Via Traiana Nova (Latin, "Trajan's New Road"). The forts and outposts along this border were garrisoned by regular Roman troops (legions and auxiliaries). It was the formal, official border, and the forts and outposts were strategically located to try to funnel the trade caravans toward official emporiums inside the border. This was not, however, a static line of defence as was long believed. As with North Africa, the Romans discovered that the topography of northern Arabia, and the nomadic lifestyle of many of its inhabitants, made strict adherence to the Roman policy of trying to establish borders along easily defensible topographic features (e.g., mountain ranges or rivers) almost impossible. Even within the official borders there were substantial regions whose population remained largely semi-nomadic (e.g., the Sinai, Negev, Auranitis, and Samawah deserts), which meant that official "control" of these regions was tenuous. These expanses were part of the Federate Frontier—territories of what the Romans considered wasteland, both along the borders and in the interior of the empire, settled by peoples that had a patron-client relationship with the Roman Empire via the terms of a treaty (Latin, foedus, hence the Roman name for these peoples, foederati, "treaty people"). These peoples were usually settled by Rome within the empire (or recognized in possession of lands they already inhabited) as something like military pioneers—they were to bring their territory into productive use for the empire, to supply recruits for induction into the regular Roman army (usually as auxiliaries), and they were to patrol their territory and hold it in the name of the empire (rooting out bandits, escorting caravans and other travellers, etc.). Nobles were often bought off with lucrative positions in the Roman civil bureaucracy and high command, including the possibility of gaining full Roman citizenship (something also attainable by those recruited into the Roman army), although the majority of the federate population occupied a social position somewhere between that of a provincial and a barbarian, and the degree of assimilation with the Greco-Roman population varied between sub-groups. The normal practice of the Romans was to settle federates far from the border region where they were recruited, but following the Third Century Crisis (ca. 235-284 CE) the empire was increasingly forced to accept federate settlement that straddled the official border (i.e., federate peoples were able to dictate better terms of settlement, which usually meant settlement close to their point of origin, and these groups often maintained ties with their ethnic kin beyond the official border). In addition to the benefits of mutual military alliance, these federate peoples usually gained access to Roman markets and often also various kinds of Roman monetary subsidies (e.g., annona, an annual supply of grain; salaria, literally "salt-money," a kind of monetary stipend; and munera, a "gift" that often took the form of payment for services rendered, such as repelling enemy invaders, although sometimes as a kind of bribe for good behavior). The treaty was usually a personal agreement made between the emperor and the chief, and usually had to be renewed when the leaders in question died and were succeeded by another person, although this gave both parties an opportunity to update the treaty if one party or the other felt it was necessary due to changing circumstances. In Roman sources, the Arab chiefs were called phylarches, a Greek term meaning "tribal chief," and thus the Arabian federate frontier of Rome is sometimes referred to as the Phylarchate. However, beginning in the late second century CE and continuing into the eighth century CE, the Arab Phylarchate system of the Federate Frontier evolved as the Romans seem to have tried various strategies aimed at bringing these disparate groups more fully into the Roman hegemony. Key to this was the recognition by the Romans of the status of particular phylarchs as being superior to those of their fellows, being accorded the status of king (Greek, basileos). Unfortunately, records for the period in question are sparse (e.g., the text of no Roman-Arab federate treaty has survived) until the end of the fifth century CE, but we know that there were three major Arab dynasties in succession that were accorded a leadership position in the Federate Frontier—the Tanukhid Kingdom (196-425 CE), the Salihid Kingdom (395-490 CE), and the Ghassanid Kingdom (490-584 CE). Each of these three will be discussed subsequently on the following History pages, so suffice it to say here that for at least the first two (i.e., the Tanukhids and Salihids) historians do not believe that this leadership position was anything more than honorary—they were accorded the highest prestige and probably had the most lucrative terms of treaty—and that they did not enjoy any kind of administrative control over the other phylarchs. This changed under the Ghassanids, who seem to have developed extensive administrative ties with all of the other northern Arabian federate groups and seem to have come closest to establishing the kind of centralized Arab monarchy that was developed by Persia's primary Arab proxy, the Lakhmid Kingdom (295-602 CE), discussed on the History page for Central Arabia. The fall of the Ghassanids and Lakhmids to the court intrigues of their respective imperial patrons (see below) is often noted by historians as being one of the preconditions that made northern and central Arabia ripe for conquest by the Muslim Arabs between the sixth and eighth centuries CE.

 

As I've mentioned, the northern Arabian Federate Frontier straddled both sides of the official border of Rome (the Limes Arabicus), and included some wilderness regions well within the borders, but the Romans also often tried to extend their influence, through both diplomacy and warfare, well beyond the borders by forming alliances with fully independent peoples who nevertheless shared regional strategic interests with Rome—in northern Arabia, I think Irfan Shahid's term, "the Arab Shield," is most useful in representing this outer layer of the Roman-Arab frontier zone. The Banu Kalb were a large federation of tribes, with a nominal capital at the large oasis of Dumah (modern Dumat al-Jandal), that dominated much of the former Lihyanite territories (excepting the Hijaz), from the Samawah Desert (i.e. the section of the Syrian Desert that extends between Palmyra and the Euphrates) through the Jawf region (NW Saudi Arabia) to the Wadi Sirhan (eastern Jordan). Although the Kalb were not always friendly to Rome, they sometimes were, and those that lived in the Samawah Desert were Roman federates. Roman diplomacy with the Kalb was aimed primarily at preventing Arab raids from further southeast, conducted by tribes such as the Banu Tayy and the Banu Taghlib, both of whom dominated the Nafud Desert region in Central Arabia (centered on the oases of Ha'il and Sakakah), as well as the Banu Ghatafan, who dominated the northern half of the Najd Plateau. The exact status of some of the tribes in the Hijaz is unknown. The Banu Bali are the only group specifically identified as Roman federates, although the Banu Lihyan, Banu Juhaynah, and Banu Udhrah all inhabited the Hejaz from the time of the fall of the Lihyanite Kingdom (ca. 106 CE) and the annexation of Nabataea (ca. 117 CE). The Roman presence in the Hijaz was always minor, and it is likely that only the Bali were federates, while the other groups were part of the Arab Shield—i.e., sometimes allied with Rome when their interests were aligned with those of the empire, and at odds with Rome when their interests diverged. As with the Kalb, alliances with the Arab tribes in the Hijaz would have been aimed at preventing raids by the tribes of the Najd Plateau—in this case, not only the Banu Ghatafan, but also the Banu Kilab and Banu Hawazin—as well as to police the caravans and caravanserai. Trade caravans still traveled up the coast from southern Arabia via Tihama and the Hijaz, despite the growing importance of sea trade, although it is noteworthy that the Banu Bali, the only certain Roman federate group, was located along the coast and may have been primarily concerned with protecting Roman ports like Leuce/Leuke (northern Hijaz) and Come/Kome (southern Hijaz).